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 Abstract 
The study analyses the kind of community which was established through the various Lomé 
Conventions. The relationship between the EC/EU and the ACP countries has undergone 
profound changes. While in the beginning the relationship was based on the (contrafactual) 
supposition of equality between the partners and fair exchange the situation turned into a more 
openly unbalanced one. The real status of the ACP countries turned from client to supplicant 
because the socio-economic and political rational for upholding the fiction of equality vanished.  
The special “post-colonial” relationship between the EC/EU and the ACP countries is likely to 
come to an end as is the particular form of community between these two groups of states. 
Even in the past the relationship was characterised by political and economic conditionality 
aimed at internal political reform, conflict prevention, and poverty alleviation. Nevertheless, as 
long as the EC/EU is not ready and willing to directly intervene in these countries it will rely on 
development aid as an indirect means to address its political concerns which now include 
refugee flight, the spread of cross border epidemic disease, and the growth of narcotics trade.  
Zusammenfassung 
Die Studie untersucht den Typ von Gemeinschaft, der durch die verschiedenen Lomè 
Konventionen etabliert wurde. Die Beziehung zwischen der EG/EU und den AKP-Staaten ist 
einem tiefgreifenden Wandel unterworfen. Während am Anfang die Beziehung auf der 
(kontrafaktischen) Unterstellung der Gleichheit der Vertragspartner und fairem Austausch 
basierte, wurde das Ungleichgewicht zwischen den Partnern im weiteren Verlauf immer 
offensichtlicher. Wurden die AKP-Staaten anfänglich als Klienten betrachtet, so wurden sie 
immer mehr zu Bittstellern, weil sich die sozio-ökonomischen und politischen Grundlagen 
veränderten, auf der die Fiktion der Gleichheit basierte. 
Das spezielle, als “post-kolonial” charakterisierte Verhältnis zwischen der EG/EU und den 
AKP-Staaten geht aller Wahrscheinlichkeit seinem Ende entgegen, genau so wie die 
besondere Form der Gemeinschaft, die sich zwischen diesen Staatengruppen entwickelt hatte. 
Auch in der Vergangenheit war das Verhältnis durch politische und ökonomische 
Konditionalität gekennzeichnet, die auf interne politische Reformen, Konfliktprävention und 
Armutsbekämpfung ausgerichtet war. So lange die EG/EU nicht bereit und willens ist, direkt in 
diesen Staaten zu intervenieren, wird sie weiterhin die Entwicklungshilfe als indirektes Mittel 
benützen, um ihren politischen Interessen Geltung zu verschaffen. Dazu zählen neuerdings die 
Flüchtlingsproblematik, der Kampf gegen die Verbreitung von epidemischen Seuchen und der 
Kampf gegen den wachsenden Drogenhandel.  
  
 
Note 
This study is part of the project “On an European Union of Citizens”, commissioned by the Austrian 
Federal Chancellery.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Die Gemeinschaft zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten beruht seit ihrer Kodifizierung in 
Lomé I auf der überraschenderweise fortdauernden Fiktion, die Lomé-Abkommen würden 
zwischen souveränen Staaten getroffen. Diese Gleichheitsfiktion erwuchs aus der 
Notwendigkeit, am Ende einer langen Periode europäischer Vorherrschaft ein Zeichen der 
Anerkennung für die formale Unabhängigkeit der AKP-Staaten zu setzen. Die Bedeutung dieser 
formalen Anerkennung wurzelte in den Formalitäten der Ausarbeitung der Handelsverträge. 
Formale Gleichheit stand im Gegensatz zur zentralen raison d’etre von Lomé – jener der 
Entwicklung. Der Bedarf einer AKP-Entwicklung und die vorausgesetzte Unfähigkeit der AKP-
Staaten, diese ohne Unterstützung der Lomé-Partner der EU herbeizuführen, setzen die 
Tatsache der Ungleichheit voraus. Trotz aller Paradoxität trug der Spielraum zwischen formeller 
Gleichheit, wie sie in den Richtlinien der Lomè-Abkommen definiert ist, und der 
Entwicklungsprämisse, die der Lomé-Konvention zugrundeliegt, zur Entstehung und zur 
Langlebigkeit des Lomé-Bündnisses bedeutend bei.  
Die Bedeutung der Handelskomponente für das Lomé-Abkommen hat sich stark vermindert. 
Seit seinem Beginn in den Römischen Verträgen war der Handel nicht nur das Herzstück der 
Lomé-Konvention sondern auch die spezifische Differenz, die Lomé von einer Vielzahl anderer 
Hilfsübereinkommen unterscheidet. Als ein primär unterstützungsorientiertes Abkommen 
machte die Lomé-Konvention diese Unterscheidung nun hinfällig. Dabei hat sie ebenso die 
Prämisse der Gleichheit der Vertragspartner, die Richtung des Entwicklungsprozesses selbst 
bestimmen zu können, unterminiert. Dies wurde ferner durch den Wegfall umsetzbarer 
(sozialistischer) Alternativen vereitelt. 
Das Konzept des “kollektiven Klientelismus” wurde zur Beschreibung der Lomé innewohnenden 
Beziehungsstruktur entwickelt. Das Hauptaugenmerk unserer Analyse der Lomé-Abkommen 
liegt dabei auf der einer Patron-Klient-Beziehung innewohnenden Ambiguität. Sie liegt u.a. im 
Sanktionspotential der AKP-Klienten gegenüber der Änderung ihrer Vertragsposition begründet. 
Angesichts der sich abzeichnenden Schwierigkeiten von Regionen, die Europa näher liegen, 
und der wachsenden Bedeutung asiatischer und lateinamerikanischer Interessen für Europa 
hat diese Sanktion nicht mehr die Wirkungskraft, die sie vielleicht einmal hatte. 
Der Wegfall der Notwendigkeit, AKP-Staaten als gleichwertige Partner anzuerkennen, sowie 
die verminderte Bedeutung eines potentiellen Rückzuges der AKP-Staaten aus Lomé 
signalisieren, daß “postkoloniale” Tage vorüber sind, wie die DG8 darlegt. Es stellt sich jedoch 
die Frage, ob in einer zunehmend nur mehr unterstützungsorientierten Beziehung zwischen 
Spender und Bittsteller für die EU Sanktionierungsmöglichkeiten ausreichend gewährleistet 
sind, um deren Vision einer ökonomischen und politischen Konditionalität durchsetzen zu 
2 — M. P. Cowen / R. W. Shenton / Community Between Europe and Africa — I H S 
 
können, wie wünschenswert diese auch immer sein mag. Zahlreiche Faktoren lassen dies 
bezweifeln. 
Die Geschichte der Versuche, die wirtschaftliche Konditionalität der “Entwicklungsassistenz” 
durch die Weltbank und den IWF zu bekräftigen, zeigt seit den frühen achtziger Jahren, daß 
ökonomische Bedingungen ohne das gleichzeitige Vorhandensein von politischen Bedingungen 
nicht akzeptabel sind. Von einem solchen Verständnis hängt auch der Bedarf nach einer 
demokratische Praktiken absichernden Institution seitens der Spender ab. Abgesehen vom 
heiklen Problem des gegenwärtigen Verhältnisses von politischer und wirtschaftlicher 
Konditionalität hat eine solche Sichtweise politische Bedingungen als ein Schlüsselelement 
der “postkolonialen” Desiderata seitens der DG8 in den Vordergrund gerückt. Die zentrale 
Frage an dieser Stelle ist, ob und/oder inwiefern Unterstützung eine effiziente 
Sanktionierungsmöglichkeit gegen Korruption oder andererseits eine Auszeichnung für gute 
Regierungsführung sein kann. 
Während demokratische Wahlen mit einem Mehrparteiensystem als ein Wert für sich 
betrachtet werden können, ist es wichtig festzuhalten, daß es keinen notwendigen 
Zusammenhang zwischen solchen Wahlen und der Bekämpfung von Korruption geben muß. 
Auch gibt es angesichts der Ambiguität der Zivilgesellschaften vieler, insbesondere 
afrikanischer, AKP-Staaten keinen zwingenden Zusammenhang zwischen der Pflege der 
Zivilgesellschaft und dem Abnehmen korrupter Praktiken. An dieser Stelle spielt die historische 
Realität der ersten demokratischen Komponente der auf die Unabhängigkeit unmittelbar 
folgenden Periode eine Rolle. Es ist weiters nicht geklärt, ob die von der DG8 vertretene 
Regionalisierung zu erwarten ist. Ereignisse, die sich in Afrika abspielen, insbesondere jene 
des wachsenden Regionalkonflikts im früheren Zaire, aber auch die Konflikte am Horn von 
Afrika, illustrieren wie fern für viele Länder solche regionalen Bündnisse sind. Auch hier ist 
wiederum die Ambiguität der Konstituierung der Zivilgesellschaften in Afrika zu hinterfragen. 
Angesichts der oben beschriebenen Schwierigkeiten ist es unwahrscheinlich, daß Sanktionen 
über den Entzug von Unterstützungen seitens der EU ausreichen werden, um die von der DG8 
erwünschte Umwälzung politischer und wirtschaftlicher Praktiken herbeizuführen. Darüber 
hinaus kann die Anwendung der Sanktionierung aus mehreren Gründen nicht durchführbar sein: 
Eine solche Verweigerung der Unterstützung könnte in bestimmten Fällen einen humanitären 
Aufschrei innerhalb der EU-Staaten zur Folge haben, oder die Konsequenzen einer 
Verweigerung, deren Motive von der DG8 spezifiziert sind – z. B. Flüchtlinge, die Verbreitung 
von grenzüberschreitenden epidemischen Krankheiten, wachsender Rauschgifthandel –, sind 
nicht akzeptabel. 
In solchen Fällen könnte sich die EU auch gezwungen sehen, auf direktere Art und Weise in 
den betreffenden AKP-Staaten zu intervenieren. Solche Interventionen, die ähnlich bereits 
vielfach zum Tragen gekommen sind, wären eine logische, wenn auch einigermaßen ironische 
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Folge der stillschweigenden Mißachtung des Lomé-Prinzips der formalen Gleichheit. In dieser 
Hinsicht könnte das Ergebnis der Beendigung “postkolonialer” Zeiten nur im Bewußtsein 
liegen, daß diese durch neue Formen kolonialer Verantwortung ersetzt wurden. 
Introduction: Highlighting the Political 
The Commission of the European Union (EU), in setting out its Guidelines for the Lomé V 
negotiations that formally begin in September 1998, has called for a ‘new and inherently 
political contract’ between the EU and the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of 
countries.1 Since, from its inception in 1975, Lomé has been based on a contract in the form of 
an international treaty between the states comprising the two groups, it is what is meant by 
‘new’ and ‘inherently political’ that command attention in the EU’s negotiating stance. Lomé V, 
it is argued, will be new because, as the Commission’s Directorate General for Development 
(DG 8) puts it: ‘Post-colonial days are over. The Union and the ACP countries have common 
interests to develop and a strategic opportunity to grasp within a brighter, more ambitious 
vision’.2 In marking out the end of the ‘post-colonial days’, DG 8 means that the earlier contract 
between the EU and ACP groups, which was generally referred to as one between as ‘donors 
and recipients’, must be abandoned. Instead of the previous aim of a Convention which was to 
promote development in the ACP area as a means toward achieving the differing ends and 
interests that inhered in the distinctive statuses of two sets of states as former colonies and 
colonisers, a new contractual Convention must now change to recognise the ‘common 
interests’ which both groups need to defend’3. The clear implication is that there is one set of 
policy objectives dealing with common problems that are generally shared by all member 
states of both groups. Thus, the ‘inherently political’ of DG 8’s stance for negotiating the new 
contract for Lomé V signals recognition of what is supposed to be a fundamental change in 
North-South relations in general. 
The ACP only superficially shares the ‘post colonial’ vision of DG 8. While the executive 
summary of the ACP’s position paper, ‘Future of ACP-EU Relations’, recognises the changed 
‘international environment’ in which Lomé V is to be negotiated, the substantive proposals 
contained therein largely call for a continuation of the Lomé IV status quo or for its 
strengthening.4 The Libreville Declaration of November 1997, issued after the first summit of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1 Directorate General for Development (DG 8), EU Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Guidelines for the negotiation of new cooperation agreements with the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, Brussels, 1997, p. 9. For the purpose of this paper, it is assumed 
that these Guidelines supercede the more tentative proposals of the earlier Green Paper. See European 
Commission, Green Paper on relations between the European Union and the ACP countries on the eve of the 21st 
century, Brussels, 1997. 
2 Ibid., p. 3. 
3 Ibid., p. 9. 
4 ACP Secretariat, Future ACP-EU Relations: Report of the Subcommittee on the Future of ACP-EU Relations 
(Executive Summary), ACP/28/059/97 Rev. 3 Brussels, October 28 1997. 
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ACP heads of state and government, confirmed the earlier position paper in recognising how 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreement, together with other changes in trade and 
investment decisions and institutions, are ‘engineering a new World Order which demands the 
adoption of more creative approaches in the management of international affairs’. However, 
while the heads of ACP member states believed ‘that a broader more intensive political 
dialogue with the European Union would enhance our partnership and cooperation’, their outline 
proposals for renegotiating Lomé consisted of asking for more of the same from the EU.5 After 
a meeting of their trade ministers in Brussels, held during May 1998, the ACP group honed in 
the Libreville Declaration by further outlining its negotiating stance, searching for special 
assistance in adjusting to WTO rules at the same time as maintaining non-preferential trade 
preferences and market access and the existing Lomé instruments such as STABEX and 
SYSMIN.6 Thus, the ACP negotiating stance has stood in marked contrast to the EU’s 
Guidelines that envisage Lomé V as a ‘strategic opportunity’ to further ‘a brighter, more 
ambitious vision’ – a vision which takes ‘globalisation’ as its chief referent:  
Significant changes in the world scene have affected the relationship between the Union and 
the ACP countries in particular the rapid globalisation of trading and financial systems with its 
opportunities and dangers, the technological revolution and the advent of the ‘information 
society’, the geopolitical upheavals caused by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the 
recognition of sustainable development for the sake of future generations.7 
Although globalisation is the now commonplace referent for the phenomena that are supposed 
to have rapidly eroded national barriers against the movement of goods, services and finance, it 
is useful to differentiate it from the internationalisation of trade, finance and production.  
What distinguishes globalisation from internationalisation is the desire and capacity of agents, 
whether these be collective or individual, to take decisions according to a global scale of 
reckoning.8 According to this meaning of globalisation, decisions to invest, trade and produce 
both presume, and act to generate, a world in which policies of nation states, and groups of the 
same, tend to converge towards common points of reference and interest. It is this sense of 
globalisation that informs the post-colonial stance of DG 8 that sees Lomé V as providing the 
opportunity for a new departure in which EU-ACP relations are to be based on the converging 
interests generated by globalisation rather than the differing interests of post-coloniality. 
 
(http://www.oneworld.org/acpsec/gabon/28059_gb.htm). 
5 First Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government, The Libreville Declaration, Libreville, Gabon, 
November 7, 1997. 
6 ACP Secretariat, Final Declaration Adopted by ACP Trade Ministers (ACP/61/027/98), Brussels, May 15 
1998. 
7 DG 8, Guidelines (1997), p. 7. Emphasis added. 
8 A key text, in a voluminous literature, is still R. Robertson, Globalisation: social theory and global culture, 
London: Sage, 1992.  
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The significance of globalisation as the theme for negotiating Lomé V can be further understood 
by contrasting it with a different idea of global relations between nations – that of globalism. 
Since the time of the Rome Treaty and Yaoundé, the 1950s and 1960s precursors of the first 
Lomé agreement, globalism was one perspective or thesis which generated dispute over in 
intra-European aims and strategies of, and for, relations with what has come to be the ACP. For 
the first 1973 formal negotiations leading to Lomé I, the Community’s Commission set out 
Guidelines that reported on the resolutions of the 1972 EEC Summit Conference. ‘The Summit 
Conference’, the Guidelines ran, ‘stressed that the Community must, without detracting from 
the advantages enjoyed by countries of with which it has special relations, respond even more 
than in the past to the expectations of all the developing countries’. However, given that the 
Summit decided to emphasise ‘the importance which the Community must attach to the 
maintenance and development of the Association Policy’, the Commission established that 
EEC ‘policy for development cooperation’ would continue to be based upon ‘a combination of a 
high degree of cooperation at regional level with a necessarily less intense degree of 
cooperation on a world scale’.9 Ellen Frey-Wouter later formalised the two perspectives of the 
global, or ‘world scale’ and the regional, or restricted spread of former European colonies which 
were associated with the EEC under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, in her 1980 account of the 
history and evaluation of Lomé I as follows: 
Western Europe’s attitude to the Third World has been shaped by two theses: one regionalist 
and the other globalist. The regionalists prefer to approach cooperation problems within a 
geographically restricted framework and the internationalists think the EEC should follow a 
policy relevant to all the developing countries.10  
A fundamental distinction between whether the Convention should be based upon an 
international or former-colonial interest in development then entered into 1980s thinking about 
what Lomé generally represented for development cooperation.11  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
9 Commission of the European Communities, Memorandum of the Commission to the Council: The Future 
Relations between the Community, the present AASM states and the countries in Africa, the Caribbean, the Indian 
and Pacific Oceans referred to in Protocol No. 22 to the Act of Accession (COM (73) 500/fin), Luxembourg, April 4 
1973, p. 1. 
The same stance had arisen in 1971 when the Commission, in providing the Council with its first general report on 
development cooperation, stated that the Community had originally embarked on a ‘regional policy of development 
cooperation’ and that this ‘part of the Community patrimony’ had to be ‘maintained, improved and reinforced’. 
Commission of the European Communities, ‘Commission Memorandum on a Community Development Cooperation 
Policy’, supplement 5/71 to the Bulletin of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1971, p. 11 (quoted in E.R. 
Grilli, The European Community and the Developing Countries, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 
52).   
10 E. Frey-Wouters, The European Community and the Third World: the Lomé Convention and its impact, New 
York: Praeger, 1980, p. 7. Emphasis added. 
11 An outstanding example is J. Ravenhill, Collective Clientalism: the Lomé Conventions and North-South 
relations, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, ch. 2; also, Grilli, 1993, chs. 1–2. 
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We will later return to the regional dimension of Lomé, and especially the concept of EurAfrica 
as a possible regional bloc, with France taking a regionalist perspective and Germany, Holland 
and Britain, upon its accession to the EEC, that of the international. For the majority of the 
Group of 77 ‘third-world’ states of the South, whose compass of action was directed at the 
international precisely because it extended beyond Europe and the EEC, a regionalist bloc of 
former colonial countries centred on Africa stood as a possible barrier against their formal 
1970s demands for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). What we aim to emphasise 
here, however, is that the change in the meaning of the global, from globalism to globalisation, 
reveals much about why the political has been highlighted in the 1998 Guidelines as the 
fundamental change in the EU stance towards the ACP. Whereas the earlier disputes between 
EEC internationalists and the regionalists over globalism was about particular colonial 
inheritances of the past, the present expression of a presumed common interest in 
globalisation, like decision-making itself, is about a projection into a future. Given the 
deficiencies of the economic in promoting past development, it is the political which now 
signals the EU aspiration to cope with the global by bringing the ACP into an understanding 
that its member states share a responsibility for coping with the global of globalisation.  
‘Though it is for the governments and peoples concerned to choose their development policies’, 
the DG 8 Guidelines affirm, ‘these policies are increasingly interdependent’.12 It is on two main 
grounds that policies are held to be interdependent. The first is that of international 
cooperation, as it was understood in the past but now from the standpoint that what happens in 
the South has an impact on the North to a far greater extent than previously. In itself, this 
ground for interdependence is more reminiscent of the global of global-ism than of global–
isation. Thus, when the authors of the current Guidelines set out the reasons for the EU’s 
‘motives, responsibilities and common interests’, they have implored the need to  
improve the management of global risks and interdependence in the fields of the environment, 
various forms of trafficking, migration, health etc. It is the interests of both the EU and ACP 
countries to use their intercontinental relationship to enhance cooperation, especially in areas 
where international cooperation is making slow progress.13 
In referring explicitly to ‘violent conflict, migratory pressure, rising extremism, drugs, 
pandemics, AIDS, etc’, the DG 8 authors make it clear that all of these problems arising from 
‘the lack of development’ in the South impose ‘threats to the security and well-being of the 
North’. Together with ‘wishing to avoid’ these ‘threats’, the Guidelines offer the EU’s ‘good 
positive grounds’ for a new Convention by ‘adjusting it to a radically different situation’.14 If this 
‘different situation’ is what is meant by globalisation, then the second ground for holding why 
policies are interdependent is that there is a potentially common interest in the same policy 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
12 DG 8, Guidelines (1997), p. 15. 
13  Ibid., p. 9. 
14  Ibid. 
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issues for all states, whether or not they are member states of the ACP or EU. It is clear then 
that the ‘new and inherently political contract’ for Lomé V, as proposed by DG 8, seeks to give 
recognition to the inherent commonality of policy. Past Lomé conventions were made politically 
possible by the recognition of the right of states to pursue divergent ‘development policies’, a 
nostrum which is repeated in the 1998 Guidelines. However, with the demise, virtually complete 
by 1989, of actually existing socialist policies, and especially those so prevalently identified 
with national protection and self-reliance among the ACP group, Lomé V has the potential to be 
the first Convention established according to a global background in which almost all states 
formally claim to orient policy towards a world of free and competitive flows in international 
trade, finance and capital investment.  
Reference is made throughout the Guidelines, as well as in other DG documents, to the 
application of ‘three principles’ through which the EU, as part of the new political contract, can 
‘perform a key role’. Along with securing recognition of policy commonality by the ACP group, 
DG 8 intends that within the EU, ‘development policies of the Member States and the 
Community complement each other’; that ‘coordination’ of development policies and 
‘operations’, towards and within ACP member states, be improved; and that EU trade, 
agricultural and other policies be made more ‘consistent with the objectives of development’.15 
It may be inferred that the same three ‘C’s’, should be applied in negotiating the new political 
contract with the ACP group of member states.  
Having thus having interpreted the change in global background as giving grounds for 
interdependence, it is easy to reiterate what DG 8 proposes to be the objectives or priorities of 
development: common interests in poverty alleviation; ‘the ‘social and cultural dimension’ 
involving human rights and social progress, environmental protection and violent conflict 
prevention, especially in Africa; and, within the common interest as detailed above, a 
differentiated approach to ACP member states through their own regional integration in various 
forms.16 For this last priority, the regional as it pertained to the global has also undergone a 
change in meaning insofar as it now pertains to intra-ACP rather than EU-ACP relations. 
DG 8’s proposed new political contract for Lomé, as expressed through the three Cs, is 
designed to maximise the use of a given amount of resources made available in the form of aid 
from the EU. More importantly, however, the proposed new political contract means that state-
sponsored economic growth through the affording of protection to markets and quantum leaps 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
15  Ibid., pp. 8–9. The three ‘Cs’ appear, for example, in a 1997 DG 8 document on poverty alleviation, where 
emphasis is also given to ‘coordination’ and ‘consistency’ although ‘coherence’, here, seems to have stood for 
complementarity of policies. These ‘principles’, it should be noted, are also meant to be extended to other, non-EU 
agencies: ‘European aid is not an isolated entity. The Community is not the only one to have made combating 
poverty a priority objective. Coordination and coherence are therefore much sought-after between combating 
poverty and the development policies embarked upon by other national, regional and multilateral agencies’. 
See European Commission, EU-ACP Cooperation in 1996: the fight against poverty, Brussels, 1997, p. 43. 
16 DG 8, Guidelines (1997), pp. 9, 16. 
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in state directed spending on general infra-structural projects and development schemes – all 
that previously constituted the developmental of Lomé – are no longer on the EU’s negotiating 
agenda. However what is most significant about DG 8’s proposed new design for development 
co-operation is the attempt to reconcile the freedom or liberty of market capitalism with the 
principle of ‘community’ wherein protection is sought against the malficient forces of capitalist 
development. The authors of the Guidelines write: 
At a time of internal and external change, the EU itself is having to come to terms with the 
need to adapt in order to sustain its social choices, defend its social model and reconcile the 
principle of competition as a force for economic progress with the solidarity necessary to social 
cohesion. The EU is looking for a way of linking the economic and the social, with social policy 
contributing to economic performance, jobs and competitiveness.17 
We have shown elsewhere the extent to which over the past two centuries or more ‘freedom 
and community’ have continually recurred as the key tenets for what the DG 8 document refers 
to as a European ‘social model’. We have also suggested that the construction of the 
European Community/Union has been predicated upon the same frame of reference recently 
reinforced by the growth of mass unemployment across Europe during a period when the 
common currency and eastern enlargement of the Union were about to happen.18 Now, after 
two-decades of structural adjustment and all that has been entailed by the attempt to secure 
the basis of economic ‘freedom’ for most ACP members, it is apposite that the same frame of 
reference for a supposed reconciliation of ‘freedom and community’ should be set out as a 
template for EU-ACP relations. Thus, Lomé V is proposed as a means to give succour to 
freedom as a means of making business enterprise within ACP member states more capable 
of entering global markets while, simultaneously, as the means whereby the mass poverty of 
non-producers in the self-employing ‘economy of the poor’ is to be alleviated through the 
associated variants of community. The question that arises is whether in the posited age of a 
‘third way’, in which the economic of freedom and the social of community are to be reconciled, 
and in the light of Lomé principles as hitherto understood, a new political contract between the 
EU and ACP can be made consistent and coherent.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
17  Ibid., p. 15. 
18  M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, ‘Community in Europe: a historical lexicon’, unpublished paper, 1998. 
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1. Principles of Lomé 
Much of the critical evaluation of Lomé has been on the grounds of the inconsistency and 
incoherence. Despite the fact that criticisms of Lomé have focussed more in recent years on 
the political of human rights and democratic practices rather than the economic of trade and 
aid matters, it has always been on both the grounds of the political and the economic that 
Lomé has been held to be inconsistent and incoherent. One academic critic, whose criticism 
is representative of that of others, especially official and quasi-official criticism from the South 
stretching back to the 1970s, has argued that the EU lacks ‘a continued commitment’ to ‘the 
founding principles of partnership, equality and mutual respect’ of Lomé.19 Gordon Crawford 
continues: 
Lomé is no longer the model of development co-operation to which other agreements could 
aspire, if ever it was. Rather the reverse process can be discerned since the unique features of 
the Convention have been so diluted and undermined as to become almost indistinguishable 
from other development aid programmes, characterised by donor influence over strategic 
aspects of economy and society. This renders both the founding principle of ‘sovereignty’ and 
the new emphasis on ‘democratic practices’ less than meaningful.20  
Inconsistency, however, and the ensuing incoherence in the conception of mutuality and 
partnership between what have become the EU and ACP states have been logically necessary 
for the continued operation of Lomé. Article 2 of Lomé IV, signed in late 1989, covering the ten-
year period 1990 and 1999, restated the founding principles of the Convention, or what became 
known as the ACP’s acquis, the rights acquired through conventions: 
ACP-EC cooperation shall be exercised on the basis of the following fundamental principles: 
– equality between partners, respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and 
interdependence. 
– the right of each State to determine its own political, social, cultural and economic policy 
options.21 
The over-riding reason for the setting out of these principles was to establish a post-imperial 
relationship in which the hitherto formal status of a colonial subject was transmuted into that of 
an active, self-interested, autonomous and equal entity – as if it were an independent citizen – 
able to determine its own course of action. A second reason was to provide a justification for 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
19  Ibid. 
20 Crawford, 1996, p. 516. 
21  Quoted in G. Crawford, ‘Whither Lomé? The mid-term review and the decline of the partnership’, Journal 
of Modern African Studies 34(3) 1996, p. 504. 
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the association of individual entities to achieve a purpose – that of development. Lomé was 
regarded as the means by which those with relatively developed wealth might aid the relatively 
very poor to develop the potential of material and other resources. Had the actual capabilities to 
develop potential capacities been equal between what have become the EU and ACP states, 
namely what contractual capacities really mean on the basis of equality, then there would have 
been no developmental purpose in the Convention. This developmental purpose for the 
existence of Lomé, the making of EU resources for development available to the ACP, 
necessarily presupposes an asymmetrical relationship between the partners. Thus, since the 
inception of the first Lomé Convention, association for the purpose of development has been 
substantially inconsistent with the principle of association between autonomous equals. Yet, 
as we also show below, this inconsistency between the developmental purpose and the 
principle of association, together with incoherence in the conceptions of mutuality and 
partnership, has been necessary for the functioning of Lomé.  
In part, the Commission’s 1998–99 stance for the re-negotiation of Lomé is a self-conscious 
response to the much-voiced criticisms of inconsistency and incoherence. DG 8’s Guidelines 
are replete with references to why and how partnership must be strengthened. It is argued that 
Lomé, ‘like all forms of cooperation’ ‘has had its shortcomings’ since ‘the principle of 
partnership has been difficult to carry through’. In setting out the difficulties of realising the 
principle of partnership which they hope will be strengthened by the new and ‘intense political 
contract’, the authors of the Guidelines refer to the development-constraining economic and 
social policies of ACP member states and their continued ‘dependence on aid, short-termism 
and the pressure of crises’ as well as to the EU’s own problems in administering trade and aid 
provisions of past conventions.22 However, these reflections on past Lomé practices are about 
what the DG 8 authors understand to be contingent and/or beyond the control of the 
Commission in implementing past Lomé agreements. Neither the views of its critics nor the 
incorporation of their criticisms into DG 8’s thinking about a new Convention directly or 
conceptually address what we have argued has been inherently inconsistent and incoherent 
about the original and continuing principles of Lomé. 
Among those who have attempted to conceptually address the principles of Lomé as they have 
been practised, John Ravenhill’s Collective Clientalism has provided both the best known and 
most convincing model of the ‘post-colonial’ period from which DG 8 seeks an escape. 
Ravenhill’s argument is that the model of a negotiated bargain between a patron and client best 
captures the asymmetrical but contractual relationship establishing the formal interdependence 
of EC/EU and ACP states. Drawing on the work of social anthropologists in Europe, Africa, and 
elsewhere in the South, Ravenhill argues that clientalism is typified by a relationship in which 
(1) two actors, patron and client, command unequal resources; and in which (2) there is some 
affective or face-to-face relation between them and in which the bargain through which the client 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
22  DG 8, Guidelines (1997), p. 7. 
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is given protection by the patron entails a process of reciprocity. However, this second aspect 
of the relation also stipulates that the resources which are reciprocally exchanged are 
incomparable in that they cannot be easily made subject to a utilitarian calculus insofar as 
they do not consist of the same order of ‘things’.23 In view of what follows below, and especially 
with regard to the fundamental issue of corruption, it is important to note that the patron-client 
relation has also been typified as (3) a type of power in which the client may be able to 
exercise a degree of sanction against the patron to the extent that the unequally endowed 
partners are interdependently indebted to each other. 24  
According to Ravenhill and others, Lomé approximates to this model of clientalism on the 
following three grounds. First, in that either as national entities or groups of member states, the 
ACP and EC/EU were not only unequal in their command over resources at the time of the 
negotiation of Lomé in 1975 but in that the difference has generally grown more pronounced 
and obvious since then. Second, the affective relation between the two groups was founded 
according to the colonial inheritance that gave vent to the regionalist perspective mentioned 
earlier. Despite the logical problem in making the transition from what is face-to-face about 
personal relations to those which are made abstract in the form of relations between states and 
among groupings of states, Ravenhill’s second basis for the establishment of patron-client 
relations is grounded upon what he has called the collective clientalism of Lomé. We will 
elaborate upon why this second ground gives some coherence to Lomé’s principles, albeit of a 
‘post-colonial’ kind, when we turn to what is implied about the vertical image of patron-client 
relations in the new DG 8 vision of a more politically intense and presumably horizontal 
partnership of community.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
23  Ravenhill, 1985, pp. 30–32; also, J. Ravenhill, ‘Asymmetrical interdependence: renegotiating the Lomé 
Convention’ in F. Long (ed.), The Political Economy of EEC Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States: 
contributions to the understanding of the Lomé Convention on North-South relations, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 
1980, p. 33. 
24  Ravenhill mainly used the used the work of Keith R. Legg and Réne Lemarchand on clientage to develop 
his unique model of applying patron-client relations to those between groups of nation states. Lemarchand, in 
connection with the question of the relation between state and civil society which we consider below, has 
latterly advanced the view that any process of reciprocation must ‘involve tangible benefits’ for ‘partners’ in a 
circuit of exchange, a view which is consistent with the benefits received by the ‘clients’ in the Lomé case.  
R. Lemarchand, ‘Comparative political clientalism: structure, process and optic’ in S.N. Eisenstadt and R. 
Lemarchand (eds.), Political Clientalism, Patronage and Development’, Beverly Hills: Sage, 1981; R. Lemarchand 
and K. Legg, ‘Political clientalism and development: a preliminary analysis, Comparative Politics 4(2) 1972; K. R. 
Legg, Patrons, Clients and Politicians, University of California Institute of International Studies, Berkeley, Working 
Papers on Development 3, n.d.; R. Lemarchand, ‘Uncivil states and civil societies: how illusion became reality’, 
Journal of Modern African Studies 30 (2) 1992, p. 191. Another source of reference for clientage is S.W. Schmidt, 
L. Guasti, C.H. Landé and J.C. Scott (eds.), Friends, Followers and Factions, Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1977. 
An asymmetrical relation of power, called power2, was formalised by Stephen Lukes, and extended by L. Udehn, 
to be incorporated by Mustaq Khan’s further development of the patron-client model. See M.H. Khan, ‘Patron-client 
networks and the economic effects of corruption in Asia’, European Journal of Development Research 10(1) 
1998, especially pp. 22–7.  
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It is the third ground for the model of clientalism, that of the generalised obligation of 
reciprocity, that lies at the heart of the argument. Reciprocity has involved an exchange of 
economic resources from the EC/EU patron for those of reputation or honour or noblesse 
oblige bestowed on the Europeans by the ACP members through what Ravenhill refers to as a 
form of ‘coercive deficiency’. In other words, the main and recurrent, as opposed to contingent, 
rationale for Lomé is not that it has involved an exchange – immediate or prospective, equal or 
not – of economic resources, but rather that it has been a central sense of being ‘European’ by 
way of reputation that has been at stake in assisting in the relief of the mass poverty of the 
South through development.25 If, then, the ACP has possessed a sanction in the Lomé 
relationship, this sanction has been the threat that an EC/EU inspired dismemberment of Lomé 
would make the Europeans deficient in their reputation for committing resources for 
development.  
‘Indeed’, Ravenhill has written, ‘one can reasonably argue that the principal commodity 
provided by the ACP in the Convention was their participation: their very ‘being there’ brought 
symbolic rewards to the European Community, which was able to claim Lomé as the 
showpiece of its development policy’.26 As for any such strong evaluation, rather than a merely 
utilitarian rendition, of why an agent is qualitatively constrained to be bound to the worth of an 
action, it is the milieu within which that agent engages in reflection over a course of action that 
determines why the obligation to act I in this rather than another way arises at a particular time 
and should be reproduced thereafter. 27 In addition to the history of relations between those 
states that now form the EU and the ACP, before and after 1975, an important ingredient of this 
milieu includes the formation of the European Community/Union itself, with some reflective 
sense of its place in the wider world between the United States, the former USSR, and the 
latter Asia. Thus, as Ravenhill also argues, and here his argument can be extended, 
development cooperation on Lomé lines, no matter how much an ‘imperfect model’, was a way 
of demonstrating that the EC/EU could ‘justifiably claim to be doing more’ for the ACP 
countries ‘than any other donor’.28 Through its principles of equality and autonomy, Lomé 
expressed a claim that a generalised obligation of the relatively rich to the poor was being 
offered without subjecting the poor, represented by the ACP member states, as being bereft of 
autonomy and subject to the ruled administration of the rich as represented by the EC/EU and 
its Commission. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
25  Ravenhill, 1980, pp. 42–3; Ravenhill, 1985, pp. 35. 
26  Ravenhill, 1985, p. 33. 
27  Philosophically speaking, the idea of a strong evaluation was coined by Charles Taylor (for example, 
‘What is human agency?’ in C. Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical papers. Volume 1, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985). The idea has been used widely as an antidote to utilitarian ways of thinking 
about social choice from the standpoint of the kind of principles set out in the Convention, especially that of self-
determination and ‘freedom’. Strong evaluation is pertinent for what is implied by symbolic reward in exchange, as 
evidenced by the work of Adam Seligman. See A.B. Seligman, The Problem of Trust, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997, esp. pp. 66–9.  
28 J. Ravenhill, ‘Adjustment with Growth: a fragile consensus’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 26(2) 
1988, pp. 208–9.  
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Ravenhill’s argument about the coherence of Lomé’s principles can be extended inwards to 
within the Community/Union of European member states. A welfare system, aided and abetted 
according to the conception of social partnership and cohesion, has been the commonly 
historical means by which obligation to the European poor has be expressed. For ACP 
countries in the South, the historical analogue to welfare has been a development apparatus. It 
is also not difficult, even bearing in mind the weakening of welfare systems of many EC/EU 
member states, to argue on the evidence of the perpetuation and extension of mass poverty 
across most ACP countries since 1975 that the Lomé model is ‘imperfect’. It is true also that, 
according to the conceptual implications of a strong evaluation, the reach and extent of the 
development apparatus bears little relation to that of a welfare system. Nevertheless, the 
question remains as to whether there is a qualitative difference between a welfare system and 
a development apparatus regarding the kind of constraint that makes the worth of poverty 
alleviation a necessary obligation on the part of state agencies. If we accept Ravenhill’s 
explanation of how the Lomé model works, and in order to answer the question about welfare, 
we need to return to the patron-client relation within a European context and one which has 
had a profound influence, whether wittingly or not, upon the current thinking of DG 8 as 
revealed in the 1998 Guidelines for negotiating Lomé. 
In his 1993 volume, Making Democracy Work , Robert Putnam examined the difference 
between regional government in the Italian North and South for a twenty-year period. From this 
study, he popularised the concept of social capital and, through a reworking of older traditions 
of mutual and civic associationism, confirmed a template for what has commonly become 
known as ‘good’ as opposed to ‘bad’ governance. Spreading across the pages of Putnam’s 
work is the distinction between vertical and horizontal conceptions of obligation. For the Italian 
South, Putnam posited the incivisme of uncivic clientage, a vertical governmental relation 
between patrons and clients, within which public life is ‘organised hierarchically, rather than 
horizontally’, in which the ‘concept of citizen’ is ‘stunted’, and within which  
few people aspire to partake in deliberations about the commonweal, and few such 
opportunities present themselves. Political participation is triggered by personal dependency or 
private greed, not by collective purpose. Engagement in social and cultural associations is 
meager. Private piety stands in for public purpose. Corruption is widely regarded as the norm, 
even by politicians themselves, and they are cynical about democratic principles. Compromise 
has only negative overtones. Laws (almost everyone agrees) are made to be broken, but 
fearing others’ lawlessness, people demand stronger discipline. Trapped in these interlocking 
vicious circles, nearly everyone feels powerless, exploited and unhappy. All things considered, 
it is hardly surprising that representative government here is less effective than in more civic 
communities.  
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Contrawise, for Putnam, civic communities in the Italian North are ‘among the most modern, 
bustling, affluent, technologically advanced societies on earth’, the ‘site of an unusual 
concentration of overlapping networks of social solidarity’, within which people  
are engaged by public issues, but not by personalistic or patron-client politics. Inhabitants 
trust one another to act fairly and to obey the law. Leaders in these regions are relatively 
honest. They believe in popular government, and they are predisposed to compromise with 
their political adversaries. Both citizens and leaders here find equality congenital. Social and 
political networks are organized horizontally and not vertically. The community values solidarity, 
civic engagement, cooperation and honesty. Government works.29 
Putnam, through his striking contrast of the polarity between uncivic clientage and civic 
community, presents us with a further set of perspectives that belong to both Ravenhill’s 
patron-client model of EC/EU-ACP relations as well as a foremost perception of what makes a 
European North different, in general, from the ACP South. In other words, in their highlighting of 
the political, the strategic vision of the DG 8 Guidelines can be interpreted as an exhortation for 
a move on the part of ACP states from a pole of clientage to that of membership in a, if not the, 
community. Since the polarity is of both internal ACP state relations, as in Putnam’s 
representation of ‘Southern’ public life, and of the external relations of the ACP states to the 
EU according to Ravenhill’s clientage model, Lomé principles face a double bind. The intended 
ends of community in the ACP region has been interwoven with the means – the same ideal 
community of ACP-EU relations – by which the end is to be developed. 
We do not take Putnam’s polarity between the uncivic of clientage and the civic of community 
as either logically or historically given. Nor, contrawise, do we need to repeat the criticism of 
Putnam’s thesis except to point out the fallacies that are involved in making the kind of 
expansive polarity between clientage and community.  30 The fallacies of polarity include the 
assimilating of political culture to state agency; the confusing of state policy performance with 
democratic practices; and the mistaking of the extent to which associational life is present for 
what could determine the cause or basis of economic development through the kind of 
generalised exchange that is involved in the reciprocal obligations of development cooperation. 
Variously, these fallacies are also present in the shift from the presumed model of clientage to 
that of community. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
29  R. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: civic traditions in modern Italy, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
p. 115 (and quoted by Seligman, 1997, pp. 75–6). 
30 Since Putnam’s rendering of community in the Italian case has been so widely extended, it has 
correspondingly attracted widespread criticism. See, for example, M. Levi, ‘Social and unsocial capital: a review 
essay of Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work’, Politics and Society 24(1) 1996 (and other critical essays in 
this same issue); S. Tarrow, ‘Making social science work across space and time: a critical reflection on Robert 
Putnam’s Making Democracy Work’, American Political Science Review 90(2) 1996; R.W. Jackman and R.A. Miller, 
‘A renaissance of political culture?, American Journal of Political Science 40(2) 1996; J. Putzel, ‘Accounting for the 
“dark side” of social capital: reading Robert Putnam on democracy’, Journal of International Development 9 (7) 
1997.  
I H S — M. P. Cowen / R. W. Shenton / Community Between Europe and Africa —15 
 
1.1 Insurance and Conditionality 
It is some basis for a mutual understanding that patrons function politically to secure economic 
protection for their clients which makes possible the establishment and continuation of a 
vertical relation of asymmetric power, whether of clientage or community. The basis of mutual 
understanding rests, in turn, on the expectation of both patrons and clients that protection will 
be afforded in return for a political payoff or reward for the recognition of the different statuses 
involved, and roles played, in the interactions of clientage. What matters are the conditions that 
establish the status of the parties involved in the form of cooperation which is predicated by 
clientage and the extent to which the exchange of economic protection for a political reward is 
conditional upon its expected reciprocation. Thus, it is the presumption of both parties that 
patrons are expected to afford protection, and that clients are expected to confer a political 
reward in return for such protection, that explains why patrons do not regard clients as mere 
supplicants resting upon the goodwill of their richer and/or more powerful patrons.  
The kind of cooperation that was formalised through Lomé in 1975 has been understood in 
terms of one principle of economic protection, that of insurance. Ravenhill, in setting out his 
model of collective clientage, has argued that ‘one of the principal roles played by landlords in 
traditional patron-client relations is to provide their tenants with social insurance against the 
vicissitudes of the market’.31 In his early appraisal of Lomé I, Reginald Herbold Green directly 
referred to the Convention as an ‘external economic insurance policy’. Kunibert Raffer and 
Hans Singer likewise described STABEX, one foremost Lomé innovation in compensating for 
fluctuations of primary product earnings through revenues rather than prices, as constituting a 
system operating ‘very much like insurance payments’.32 It was this insurance principle which 
led Raffer and Singer to argue that Lomé I ‘was the best’ deal a group of Southern countries 
‘ever got from any group of donors’ because the contractual provision to provide economic 
protection, through the interlinking of trade and aid, was couched in ‘the pronounced emphasis 
on equality’ between the ACP and EC/EU partners.33  
The likening of the operations of Lomé to a policy of insurance reveals, yet again, the 
conceptual problems of the Convention. For insurance to function, premiums have to be paid. 
For those who have argued that Lomé was more progressive than such pre-1975 arrangements 
as the French-dominated Yaoundé agreements or the post-colonial residues of the British 
system of Commonwealth preferences, it is the contractual provision between formally equal 
partners that is key. However, the insurance principle highlights the different statuses of 
‘donors’ and ‘recipients’ in that is rests upon the mutual understanding that the EC/EU group 
donates premiums, through aid, on behalf of the ACP group, who cannot afford both the risks of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
31  Ravenhill, 1985, p. 27. 
32  R.H. Green, ‘The child of Lomé: messiah, monster or mouse?’ in Long, 1980, p.8; K. Raffer and H.W. 
Singer, The Foreign Aid Business: economic assistance and development co-operation, Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 1996, p. 88. 
33  Raffer and Singer, 1996, p. 88. 
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trading internationally and the premiums to insure against the risks which inhibit trade. 
Furthermore, while the analogy of insurance may be apposite in that key Lomé instruments 
provide compensation for the loss of an existing resource arising out a hazardous activity, the 
insurance principle does not in itself ensure expansion in the supply of the resource, or any set 
of resources, that might enable a definitive change in the status of the recipient to the extent 
that it would become self-sufficient in paying the premium of insurance without the aid of the 
donor.  
Motives for paying premiums through aid could be, and have been, justified by the donors of 
Lomé on any number of grounds, ranging from an historically justifiable and/or expedient 
compensation for past and present economic colonialism and neo-colonialism to the moral 
imperative that poverty alleviation and eradication is an end in itself. All these grounds implied 
that the motive for aid should be unconditional on the part of the donor. Yet, whatever the 
particular justification for the payment of the insurance premium by the Lomé donors, one key 
economic condition has been that the insurance principle should work to change the status of 
the recipient and thereby fulfil the contractual condition for generalised exchange among 
equals. For equality to have any substance, the progressive potential of Lomé thus lay in the 
trust that that the economic capacity of the ACP group would be developed so as to enable its 
members to become able to pay the insurance premium themselves. When the ACP heads of 
states declared in 1997, in their attempt to maintain the status quo of Lomé, that ‘the 
development of our countries is first and foremost our responsibility and that of our peoples’, 
they were summing up precisely what the EC/EU had always expected from the other partner 
to the Convention.34  
According to the clientage model, on the other hand, the insurance premium is paid by the 
donor as a reward for the enhancement of reputation that accrues to the donor by virtue of its 
payment. In principle, there is no economic condition that governs the process by which this 
symbolic reward is paid materially in the form of the premium. However, it may be presumed 
that motive of the donor is made conditional on account of the worth of its reputation. If its 
reputation ceases to matter to the donor, or becomes unrelated to the risk of trading, then the 
payment of the insurance premium by the donor may cease. Or,  the premium may be of so 
little material significance to the recipient that its bestowal of reward ceases to matter to either 
donor or recipient. Trust by clients in the conditionality of the donor’s motives is hazardous, 
resting as these do on goodwill. Therefore, to prevent the status of client regressing to that of a 
supplicant, there will necessarily be some expectation on the part of the client that it has to 
acquire an additional premium, from another source, to compensate for the loss of goodwill.  
Adam Seligman, in partly drawing on the work of anthropologists, has taken on board the 
argument that trust is generated when individuals move between two systems or models of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
34  ACP Heads of State, Libreville Declaration (1997). 
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interaction in such a way that they are uncertain of what reactions to actions on the part of one 
are to be expected from another. Moreover, according to Seligman’s reading of studies of small-
scale forms of associative action, trust is made more necessary where statuses are 
ambiguous, relations between individual persons indeterminate, and resources scarce. We can 
follow Seligman in assuming that ‘trust is some sort of belief in the goodwill of the other, given 
the opaqueness of others intentions and calculations’ in a situation in which opaqueness, for 
any one agent, ‘rests precisely on that aspects of alter’s behaviour that is beyond the 
calculable attributes of role fulfilment’.35 When this account of trust is brought into the clientage 
model of Lomé, it is important to emphasise, firstly, that trust inheres in the ambiguity of 
interaction between individual agents and, secondly, that models of interaction rest upon the 
familiar and the small-scale of interaction.  
In the Lomé Convention, relations between the partners are opaque precisely because the roles 
which they might play according to clientage, with its statuses of patron and client, are 
intertwined with those of a formal economic contract in which the roles of the participants are of 
those agents who have equal capacities to co-determine a course of action. Further following 
Seligman, trust inheres in the interstices between the models of, say, clientage, carrying some 
conception of ‘status’ and that of contract where individuals meet each other as mere 
economic agents. As Seligman puts it, trust inheres in the ‘undefined spaces’ between the 
‘role definitions’ implicated in the models of status and contract, or that of the ‘metaphorical 
space between roles, that area where roles are open to negotiation and interpretation’. 36 
Provided it is assumed that Lomé rests upon some contention that the agents, of the EC/EU 
and the ACP, are familiar to each other and that interaction is as if it were small-scale, then 
their expectations of each other are necessarily ambiguous when one is said to ‘trust’ the other 
in providing the insurance premium upon the condition that it will secure the process of 
economic development. .  
However, as Seligman also shows, there are two forms of unconditionality that secure a trust 
relationship. The first form of unconditionality, that which can be attributed to a commonly 
understood familiarity is, for Seligman, a ‘form of unconditionality in its own right ’. Examples of 
this first form of unconditionality include those founded on kinship, affection and friendship as 
well as their metaphorical counterparts such as ‘the family of nations’ which gave rise to the 
British Commonwealth and French Community variants of an image of a post-colonial 
EurAfrica. Unconditionality occurs in the familiar case, that of the familiar metaphor, because 
the family of nations are regarded as if they are individuals embroiled in affective relations. A 
second form of unconditionality, ‘as a mechanism for maintaining system confidence’, stems 
from social preconditions of generalised exchange. It is because of the existence of this 
second form of unconditionality that Seligman insists that trust ‘cannot be reduced to 
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familiarity alone’. When ‘rooted in the structural composition of the division of labour’, and 
expressed as some form of social solidarity in ‘community’, unconditionality is necessarily 
abstracted from any sense of personal familiarity and all its metaphors. Between the two 
realms of trust as ‘pristine trust and trust as a principle of generalised exchange’ there is 
contradiction and tension which is not easily overcome by the kind of associational 
arrangements that attempt, in the name of community, to marry the two.37 It is now possible to 
show how the ACP-EC/EU relation has been played out through the kind of inherent tension 
that subsides in the trust relationship.  
‘There was an inherent tension’, Ravenhill concluded in his Collective Clientalism, ‘between the 
ACP Group’s demand to be treated as equal in the relationship and its unwillingness to provide 
reciprocity’. He further argued that a ‘similar contradiction and tension underlay demands for 
equality and for a contractual relationship on the one hand and the expectation that EEC would 
play the role of a conventional patron on the other’. Ravenhill continued:  
ACP states aspired to the material benefits of clientalism while refusing to accept the status 
of clients or to appear subordinate in the relationship. When the EEC behaved in the manner 
of a typical patron in unilaterally defining the nature of the relationship and administering it in a 
paternalistic fashion, the ACP attempted to curtail this behaviour by emphasising the 
contractual obligations of the Community under the convention.  
And:  
On the other hand, the ACP expected the Community to go beyond the terms of the 
Convention in meeting its generalized obligation to its client in the ‘spirit’ of Lomé: in this 
instance it was often the Community that fell back on the contractual nature of the Convention 
as a means of delimiting its obligations.38 
In the light of Seligman’s account of unconditionalities, as understood through the problem of 
trust, we can rework Ravenhill’s reasons for why the tension inherent in Lomé practices have 
stemmed from the incoherence and inconsistency in its principles.  
From the outset, the generalised obligation that the ‘spirit’ of Lomé was meant to express was 
one of generalised exchange but not simply so. Seligman’s reference to ‘the structural 
composition of the division of labour’ is pertinent in two ways. First, as an insurance principle, 
the Lomé system was designed to maintain confidence in exchange between primary-product 
and manufacture-producing countries. Second, it was seen from some influential quarters as 
an exchange between ACP producers, as if workers, and the EC/EU, as if the capitalist 
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I H S — M. P. Cowen / R. W. Shenton / Community Between Europe and Africa —19 
 
employers of workers in the South. Julius Nyerere, the former president of Tanzania spelt out 
this conviction in his Unity for a New Order when he claimed that: ‘The truth is that we need 
power to negotiate, just as we need power to go on strike. So far we have been negotiating as 
noisy and importune supplicants. We need to negotiate from a position of power’.39 Nyerere’s 
injunction for the need ‘to go on strike’ is a prime example of the indeterminacy that arises 
from the ambiguities of status and role from which the trust relation of Lomé was generated. 
Given the third ground for clientage, as discussed above, it might be presumed that it was from 
the status of a client, rather than that of a mere supplicant, that Nyerere was threatening the 
removal of the symbolic reward of reputation by the Southern countries of the ACP group. A 
careful reading of Nyerere’s words, however, demonstrates that this may not have been what he 
had in mind.  
Reputation, as Seligman affirms, is necessary to establish a trading relationship.40 Lomé 
involved reputation because it attempted to put trade relations on a new footing through the 
insurance principle. By affording protection as a condition for entering a market, in this case an 
international market, and then realising the possibilities of effective exchange, clientage could 
be subsumed by an ACP-EC/EU relation between formal and substantive equals. In other 
words, there has been no symbolic reward for the EC/EU, along lines that Ravenhill’s analysis 
of Lomé contemplates, other than that accruing from the establishment of Lomé itself. The 
symbolic reward accruing to the EC/EU member states may have been significant as a 
necessary means to an end, with Lomé established as a means to that end of generalised 
exchange, but it was insufficient to stand as the condition which would make the EC/EU 
unconditionally extend the insurance premium through the vital principle of Lomé. Given this 
view of Lomé, what Nyerere possibly did have in mind was that once the conditions for free and 
equal exchange had been established, the ACP states of the South were relatively unfree in 
their role as clients, let alone supplicants, to alter the conditions of exchange. Rather, for 
Nyerere, it was as producers who, as such, had the capacity to withdraw from the market – via 
a ‘strike’ – products both necessary to Northern countries and for which they had no alternative 
source of supply, that could provide the sanction which Nyerere saw as necessary to secure 
greater power for the Southern group. 
Nyerere, in transforming countries of people into classes of workers, was expressing a view 
typical of the 1970s. Nowadays, it is more likely to be supposed that countries are constituted 
by and of small capitalists. Whatever the tenor of the times, there has been a general 
tendency, evidenced repeatedly in the works discussed so far in this paper, to treat the EC/EU 
and the ACP, as well as the member states of which they are composed, as if these were 
imbued with the agency of a person. We now have to break with this individualistic 
presupposition for three reasons. First, neither the states that have come to comprise the EU 
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nor those of the ACP are internally homogenous. Second, neither the ACP nor the EU are 
homogenous collections of states. Third, the ACP and EU themselves are not homogenous 
organisations. Expanding on this third point, we note that, as Ravenhill’s model of collective 
clientalism partly bears out, the ACP and EC/EU, when they act collectively as two associated 
bodies of individual countries of the South and North, have the statuses of patron and client. 
The ACP and EC/EU groups are understood as collective clients who mediate between nation 
states, however the principle of clientage remains. It is through the institutional arrangements 
of the Community/Union and a regional grouping of the South that the insurance principle is 
negotiated and that the tensions inherent in conditionalities are meant to be mediated.41 Be 
this as it may, one issue that has commanded attention is the differential in the organising 
capacities of the two groups. There is little doubt that the asymmetry that has existed between 
them has been accentuated by differences in the form and extent to which they have been 
associated for purposes of negotiation and mediation. It is difficult to imagine an equivalence in 
voice between the European Community/Union, with its extensive institutional apparatuses 
spreading far beyond what is directed towards relations with a part of the South, and a 
southern grouping of countries whose sole purpose in associating through the ACP was to 
conduct relations with the EC/EU. That said, there is a twofold problem of collective clientage.  
The first problem, upon which Ravenhill puts much stress, is that the ties between particular 
EC/EU states and their Southern counterparts of the ACP, in the form of affective relations 
inherent in the British Commonwealth or French Community or, say, special relations between 
Sweden and Tanzania, cut across the potential for association among all states in the South. It 
is also in this light that Putnam’s ideal of a civic community, as quoted above, gives vent to 
some communitarian ideas about relations between countries of the South. Equally, as will 
become clearer below, the EC/EU has been constrained, if not conditioned, by obeisance 
towards other powerful Northern sources of bilateral state and multinational authority such as 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the G7. Furthermore, as the history of 
the EC/EU has shown, the Community of Europe has been constructed through the regulative 
authority of communitarian bodies, such as the EC/EU Council, Commission or Parliament, 
that continue to be beset by problems arising from their constitutive basis – the so-called 
subsidiarity of national interests.  
Second, there is a conception of organic community contained within Ravenhill’s conception of 
collective clientage. For example, it is suggested that the sum of Lomé instruments are greater 
than their particular parts precisely because of the affective kind of unconditionality that can be 
held to serve as the pre-contractual arrangement through which it is supposed that individual 
agents, here taking a state form, decide to enter into exchange.42 However, if the state is 
treated in the same way, according to an organic conception of a collective interest of citizens, 
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it is no longer an individual entity. As of a social organism, to use the well-trodden metaphor, 
the state mediates between particular interests in society. When the argument is made that 
the state is an organic part of society, the intent is usually to counteract the private expression 
of interest on the part of those who rule the state. Thus, to be capable of mediation, the 
presumption is that those who rule the state, normally through a collective class interest, have 
a duty to subsume their private interests in the name of an organic whole and to act collectively 
on the basis of society at large.  
As we will see below, both economic and political conditionality have appeared in Lomé as part 
of the injunction that a private interest in accumulation on the part of those who rule the state is 
not consistent with the application of the insurance principle. A private appropriation of the 
insurance premium, commonly called corruption, is meant to be countered by the injunction 
that it is the duty of ACP member states to serve the interest of all. If we extend the external 
dimension of the clientage model to what is internal within ACP member states, then the Lomé 
clients are effectively enjoined to be patrons securing the protection of the poor within their own 
territorial bailiwicks. However, if the model is grounded according to how the EC/EU has acted, 
then the internal patron-client relation faces the same kind of problems which we addressed 
above and, moreso, aggravates the tension inherent in the trust relation inhering between 
states when their rulers are meant to simultaneously act out the roles of patron and client.  
Third, community, as a necessary precondition and adjunct to the presupposed autonomy of 
individuals who are involved in a normal course of exchange, has appeared in the EU DG 8 
proposals in relation to the idea of a regional community of nations. Regional cooperation 
between nation states within the ACP group has been stressed as a necessary means for 
making the transition towards global markets. ACP member states are enjoined to act 
regionally, in association with each other, by finding a regional source of protection in a world of 
free exchange between ‘individuals’, of firms and enterprises who would not otherwise produce 
and trade profitably according to the competitive conditions of generalised exchange. It is 
towards the regional question that we now turn.  
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2. The Regional Question: a Historical Overview of the 
Relation between the Economic and the Political 
For the past half-century or so, confusion has surrounded the question of whether European aid 
to Africa has been officially intended to served a political or an economic end. During the 
Second World War, for example, the United States put the British government under pressure 
to declare a colonial policy that gave some commitment to political independence. The British, 
responding during 1942–43, declared that economic development was to serve as a means to 
eventually make the colonial territories politically self-governing under majority rule. Oliver 
Stanley, the British Colonial Secretary declared, in his July 13, 1943 major statement on 
Colonial Policy, that 
If self-government is to succeed it has to have solid, social and economic foundations, and 
although without them spectacular political advances may draw for their authors the plaudits of 
the superficial, they will bring to those whom it is designed to benefit nothing but disaster.43 
‘Parent states’, it was officially declared in another statement, had the ‘duty’ to ‘guide and 
develop the social, economic and political institutions of the colonial peoples until they were 
able, without danger to themselves and others, to discharge the responsibilities of government’. 
It was further stated that the natural resources of the colonies should be ‘organised and 
marketed not for the promotion merely of commercial ends, but rather for the service of the 
people concerned and the world as a whole’.44 Yet, barely five years later, when post-war food 
and raw material supply had become the major British economic problem, the then Foreign 
Secretary, Ernest Begin, declared:  
What I am anxious to do, in order that we can develop an independent position with the United 
States instead of being supplicants, is to have a policy which, in addition to feeding our 
industries here, will give a priority to developments which will produce the raw materials in short 
supply…45 
Although Bevin was mainly interested in the Middle East and North Africa, his 1947 declaration 
is one origin of what has become known as EurAfrica, the primarily economic perspective that 
politics should serve as a means to promote and develop raw material supply in Africa for 
consumption in Europe.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
43 Quoted in F. Cooper, Decolonization and African Society: the labour question in French and British Africa, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 113. 
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Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, p. 224. 
45  Quoted in M. Cowen, ‘The British state and agrarian accumulation in Kenya’ in M. Fransman (ed.) Industry 
and Accumulation in Africa, London: Heinemann, 1982. 
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In the event, for Africa from a British vantagepoint, it was the political perspective of trusteeship 
which came to dominate that of EurAfrica until the 1970s when, due to the 1973 oil shock in 
particular, fear about raw material supply resurfaced as one of the contributory factors making 
the insurance principle of Lomé possible. However, as in 1947, the fear of shortage dissipated 
almost as fast as the schemes that were laid down to increase production with a view to the 
realisation of the EurAfrican perspective. What is pertinent here, in view of the 1998 EU 
proposals for Lomé V, is that the idea of the regional played a large part in making possible a 
compromise between the internationalist and EurAfrican perspectives and, therefore, what was 
seen to be the relation between the economic and political ends of aid to Africa. From the 
standpoint of colonial powers, the economic of EurAfrica represented a regional association for 
Africa as a whole in relation to Europe, whereas the political of trusteeship, with its 
internationally orientated conception of the economic, was brought to bear upon the regional of 
the intra-African economic grouping of colonies. Thus, the compromise was to politically 
mediate, and minimise, the regional meaning of EurAfrica as a British imperial vision of Africa.  
Regional production and supply councils were established for British West and East Africa and 
for the British Middle East to supply raw materials and provisions for the allied war effort as well 
as to promote import-substituting consumer good industries in colonial territories. While the 
remit of these regional authorities was economic, regionalisation also served a British purpose 
of containing American and local pressures for self-government. They also served to meet the 
American demand for the international trusteeship of colonies through the kind of association 
that had emanated in the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission and was later to be 
contentious for the Pacific islands.46 As a senior British Colonial Office official argued, ‘we are 
suffering at the moment from too much independence and too little inter-dependence. The 
whole idea of fostering independence of individual Colonies is quite contradictory to the idea of 
regional association’.47 Regional Commissions, it was envisaged, were to be the means 
through which political self-government was to be reached through the means of economic 
development.  
The post-war East African High Commission followed by the Central African Federation of the 
Rhodesias and Nyasaland, to take but two examples, were established partly in line with the 
earlier remit to promote regional associations. These variously involved the functions of a 
customs union and common market, a common services organisation and, as Federation 
indicated, a form of government which was awarded major responsibilities for defence and 
economic development. Yet, most, if not all, colonial regional associations had been dissolved 
by the time of the arrival of Lomé I. ‘Independent statehood’, thought by the British Foreign 
Office officials in 1943 to be ‘a conception which, in any case, may be meaningless a 
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generation or two from now’48, largely proved to be incompatible with the kind of regional 
authority that had been inherited from the colonial period. Pan-Africanism was to prove equally 
elusive as a historical antidote to nation-state sovereignty of the kind that informed Lomé.  
Pan-Africanism was envisaged as the political antithesis to an economic conception of 
EurAfrica that contained a neo- or post-colonial reinforcement of a division of labour in which 
the manufacturing North and the primary-producing South were made ‘complimentary’ to and 
‘interdependent’ with each other. 49 When Kwame Nkrumah, for example, proffered his all-Africa 
economic union it was to make Africa politically independent of Europe.50 He stood in 
opposition to both the regional associationism of Yaoundé and the forms of intra-African 
association which his antagonists, such as Nyerere, had proposed as economic stepping 
stones for an eventual political union of Africa. Yet, what has been called a ‘new’ or Pan-
Africanist form of regionalism has been said to stand on grounds of ‘self-reliance’ in opposition 
to Lomé as an evidential form of EurAfrica and against the ‘old’ or colonial forms of regionalism 
which stemmed from the second world war and its aftermath. Despite their varying range of 
functions and origins, the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS), the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC), have all been presented as newer forms of regional 
association that have the potential to be, if not Pan-African, then at least Africa-centric rather 
than vestiges of EurAfrica.51 And, whether or not regional co-operation is directly seen as an 
alternative to Lomé, the Pan-Africanist conviction has been that free trade agreements between 
African states can ‘delink’ Africa from Europe by eroding the importance of Africa’s preferential 
economic relations with the European Community/Union.52 It was from an economic 
perspective, for example, that the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action of the Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) envisaged that an African Common Market, leading to an African Economic 
Community, would be created by the year 2000.53  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
48  Quoted in Cowen, 1986, p. 50. 
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COMESA, constituted by 20 countries in 1994, replaced the Preferential Trade Association for Eastern and 
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52 Martin, 1982, p. 234. 
53 Ibid., p. 236; Mailafia, 1997, pp. 14, 28–9.  
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As 2000 approaches, regional co-operation of a Pan-Africanist nature has been little more than 
a will o’ the wisp. Evidence, albeit from 1993, shows that neither intra-African recorded regional 
trade flows nor the share of intra-African trade in the total trade of African countries have 
changed significantly from what they were before the new forms of regional co-operation 
appeared from the late 1970s. While the trade impact of regional co-operation has been 
negligible, there is some evidence to suggest that regional associations have played some part 
in trade policy convergence between neighbouring states.54 As we shall also see below, the 
impact of regional co-operation seems to be little different from that which Lomé preferences 
and provisions have had in promoting ACP-EC/EU trade. Although trade is only one element of 
co-operation, and while there are a complex of forces determining the extent to which the 
contemporary forms of regional co-operation can realise a potential for economic development, 
the question that arises is the extent to which the politics of regional association is consonant 
with the general economic rationale which seems to govern the emphasis put upon regionalism 
in the EU proposals for negotiating Lomé V for 2000.  
The DG 8 Guidelines propose that, apart from a general agreement with all ACP countries, it is 
the intention of the Commission to conduct separate negotiations with blocs of countries within 
the framework that has been roughly established by the newer forms of regional co-operation. 
‘Regionalised economic integration agreements’, the authors write, ‘would consolidate the ACP 
countries’ access to the European market and introduce an element of reciprocity for EU 
exports. Such agreements would be a key step on the way to overall liberalisation.’ 55As we will 
make clear below, the EU demand for a reciprocal trade regime represents a major break with 
the Lomé convention. In line with the attempt to break with the post-colonial past, including 
what was implied by the model of clientage and the symbolic reward of reciprocity, DG 8 
proposes that Lomé V should differentiate between ACP regions according to the ‘the level of 
development, constraints and capacities’ that determine what degree of reciprocity can be 
afforded by each. And, in referring to an ‘enhanced economic partnership’, through which 
development aid would be applied as an adjunct to the trade agreement with each region, the 
Guidelines envisage the ‘gradual establishment of a free-trade area in accordance with WTO 
 
Likewise, it was primarily on economic grounds that regional co-operation featured strongly in the 1989 Economic 
Commission for Africa’s Alternative Adjustment Framework, the alternative plan of action to Structural Adjustment 
Policy as determined by the IMF and World Bank. 
54  See M. Vehnamäki, ‘Regional co-operation under the Lomé Convention’ in M. Vehnämäki (ed.), Finland and 
the Future of the Lomé Convention, University of Helsinki Institute of Development Studies Report B 29/98, 1998; F. 
Foroutan, ‘Regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: past experience and future prospects’ in J. de Melo and A. 
Panagariya (eds.), New Dimensions in Regional Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
Foroutan’s evaluation has been summarised in P. Collier and J.W. Gunning, ‘Trade policy and regional integration: 
implications for the relations between Europe and Africa’ World Economy 18(3) 1995, p. 401; H.–B. Solignac 
Lecomte, ‘Options for future ACP-EU trade relations’, ECDMP Working Paper 60, Maastricht, 1998.  
Lecomte, p.15, has used IMF trade statistics to show that intra-regional trade in 1995 accounted for 11.5 per cent 
of all SADC trade; 8 per cent for the EAC; and 3.3 per cent for CARICOM.  
55 DG 8, Guidelines (1997), p. 25. 
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rules’ upon the basis of the creation of ‘highly integrated economic areas’.56 Regional co-
operation appears, therefore, as a stepping stone towards the exposing of all ACP countries to 
international free trade instead of one towards the creation of the Economic Community of 
either Pan- or EurAfrica. 
If it is asked why the intermediate stepping stone of a ‘highly integrated’ regional economic 
area, a regional economic community, is necessary for ACP member states in the global re-
orientation of policy, then the answer lies in the insurance principle of Lomé discussed above. 
To bear the risk of change associated with investment in making production conditions 
internationally competitive, protection has to be afforded through compensation to what is 
taken to be a potential population of producers at large. Regional co-operation involves the 
dissolution of the Lomé trade regime of preferences in favour of making aid increasingly apply 
at the regional level where larger populations are made to share the risks of globally orientated 
trade and investment. 
The colonial history of regional co-operation highlights the question, especially for small 
territories ranging from Fiji to Gambia, of what is economically necessary to secure political 
independence. Once the relation between the political and economic is inverted, as in much of 
the recent EU reasoning about Lomé V, then the political serves merely as some means to 
enjoin the association of what are presupposed to be independent states into economic 
communities for the purpose of economic development. Two important points arise out of this 
political injunction for co-operation. The first point can be made by virtue of the example of the 
EC sponsorship and strong support for SADCC. In this case the injunction to regional 
association seemed to work because the latter was directed at an ‘external’ political imperative 
against apartheid South Africa and the form of co-operation served as an ‘internal’ conduit for 
disbursing programmed project aid. After apartheid, however, South Africa has come to 
overwhelm the SADC, provoking other member states to effectively disassociate from this 
regional authority.  
The second point is that when co-operation is driven by the coupling of political contingency 
with particular business interests at work within the region in question, then the political 
injunction does not in itself necessarily create the stepping stones that facilitate the entry of 
small countries into globally-defined international markets. This is especially so when co-
operation is also driven by the interest of one or more dominant states within the region such 
as Nigeria for ECOWAS, Kenya and Zimbabwe for the COMESA, or Kenya and Uganda for the 
present-day revival of the old East African Community. In these cases, as for others in Africa, 
political contingency has increasingly become a matter of armed warfare between member 
states of the same and/or overlapping economic areas. The following report, in August 1998, 
illustrates the point graphically:  
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A year ago the United States government was touting the idea of an African Renaissance 
spearheaded by key countries which – if not exactly democratic – at least avoided the 
excesses of corrupt old-style African dictatorships. Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Angola Eritrea and Ethiopia would form a cohesive, progressive African bloc, with 
South Africa as the region’s diplomatic power. 
However, the report continued: 
The last three months have seen it all unravel. First, Ethiopia and Eritrea went to war. Now, 
Rwanda and Uganda have turned against the Congo, provoking Angola and Zimbabwe to wade 
in and defend [President] Kabila. President Nelson Mandela called a summit last weekend, but 
the most important players did not turn up; he begged for a ceasefire and no one listened.57  
Furthermore, it is the business interests of those who hold state power in countries entering 
into regional associations that may well provide the impetus for co-operation.58 While a private 
business interest may well lead to the social outcome of development infrastructure of the kind 
which regional co-operation furthers, it makes the insurance principle of Lomé highly 
problematic in that there is no social guarantee that the political injunction to co-operate serves 
to protect the population at large.  
3. Trade and Aid 
3.1 Trade 
Lomé trade provisions were designed to provide tariff and quota free access for ACP exports to 
the Community without requiring that ACP member states necessarily provide reciprocal 
access to European exporters. However, the literature on Lomé abounds with analyses 
showing that the Convention has had little or no impact on ACP-EC/EU trade flows or their 
share in the total trade of the two groups. Table 1 shows the extent to which the share of 
EC/EU imports from the ACP group has declined during the period of Lomé. Likewise, there 
has been little change in the share of ACP imports from the EC/EU over the same period, 
though exports from the Community/Union to the ACP area as a whole have not declined 
relatively as much as in the other direction.59 The analyses of trade flows shows that there has 
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been some impact at the margins but that, overall, the impact of the Lomé trade regime has 
been swamped by that stemming from production conditions within the ACP group and by the 
effects of general European and international trends in trade policy. It is hardly surprising then 
that the DG 8 Guidelines make the bald statement that ‘EU-ACP trade co-operation has not 
really fulfilled its objectives’. Furthermore, when it is said that the ‘ACP countries’ trade 
performance has generally been disappointing and Community businesses have shown 
relatively little interest in them’, the implication is that the delinking of, say, sub-Saharan Africa 
from Europe has happened by default.60 Except for at the margins, containing a few selected 
imports of food and raw materials which included Nigerian oil until the 1990s, any general neo-
colonial interest in the ACP has been minimal.  
Table 1: Share of EC/EU imports from selected regions, 1976–1994 
Region 1976 1980 1985 1990 1994 
 percentage share 
ACP 6.7 7.2 6.7 4.7 2.8 
Asia 4.2 5.9 6.5 11.0 13.1 
Latin America 5.3 5.1 6.5 4.6 5.4 
Mediterranean 6.1 6.1 8.1 6.5 6.1 
All ‘developing countries’ 44.8 42.4 34.7 31.2 34.2 
Source: Eurostat – ODI, 199661 
As table 1 indicates, the ACP share of total EC imports did significantly increase during Lomé I 
(1975–1979), a period when the values of food and oil exports, the latter overwhelmingly from 
 
ACP area accounted for three per cent of all EU exports. This proportion fell to two per cent in 1985 and less than 
1.5 per cent in 1992.    
J.Moss and J. Ravenhill, 1987; ‘The evolution of trade under the Lomé Conventions: the first ten years’ in C. 
Stevens and J.V. van Themaat (eds.), Europe and the International Division of Labour: new patterns of trade and 
investment with developing countries, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1987, p. 119; Eurostat – ODI, 1996. 
60 DG 8 Guidelines (1997) p. 22.  
A number of commentators have repeated the refrain that ‘without the trade and aid favouritism afforded ACP 
states by the EEC under Lomé, a bad situation would have been made worse’.  
I.V. Gruhn, ‘Lomé Convention renegotiations: a litmus test for North-South discussions’ in R.Boardman, T.M. Shaw 
and P. Soladatos (eds.) Europe, Africa and Lomé III, Lanham Md: University Press of America, 1985, pp. 21, 31; 
also, J. Ravenhill, ‘Europe and Africa: an essential continuity’ in Boardman, Shaw and Soladatos, 1985, p. 55. 
While the refrain about ‘things may have been worse’ might be so, it is the reversal of the earlier EC/EU 
expectation that ‘things could get better’ which counts here.  
61 Reproduced from M. Voutilainen, ‘Economic issues and trade preferences under the Lomé convention’ in 
M. Vehnämäki, , 1998, p. 12. 
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Nigeria, rose sufficiently to make it seem that the Lomé trade regime had some potential to 
create trade. However, even during this period EC imports of non-oil materials and 
manufactures from the ACP were largely unaffected by Lomé preferences. Thereafter, with the 
possible exception of some food exports such as sugar, bananas, beef and horticultures, Lomé 
made no significant difference to the structure of ACP exports to the EC/EU.62 But perhaps the 
most obvious unfulfilled intention of the original Convention was the failure of export 
diversification. Despite the mutually expressed intent to change the structure of exports from 
ACP countries to the EC/EU, little progress has been made in the transition from primary to 
secondary product exports. Contrawise, it was after 1985, during the periods of Lomé III and IV, 
when priority was given to agriculture within the ACP area, that manufactured imports rose so 
rapidly from Asia, and East Asia in particular, to the EC/EU. 
Among the reasons accounting for the failure of the Convention to increase the value of ACP 
exports to the EC/EU the following are apposite. First, even during Lomé I roughly 70 per cent 
of ACP exports would have entered EC markets on a duty free basis because they were 
covered by pre- Lomé preferences. From Lomé II onwards, the significance of the Convention’s 
trade provisions was outweighed by the EC’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSPs) 
together with the reduction in its Common External Tariff (CET) which followed successive 
GATT rounds of international negotiations aimed at the gradual elimination of trade protection. 
To this extent, WTO rules are merely the culmination of a process through which privileged 
preferences of the Lomé type have been eroded. Secondly, ACP exports to the EC/EU have 
been subject to ‘rules of origin’ procedures, normally requiring that between 40 and 60 per cent 
of the value of imports are added within the country of origin. Together with the effects of the 
special quota agreements over textiles, for example, exceptions to duty-free entry into the 
EC/EU have made the transition away from primary product exports less easy than it might 
have been. Thirdly, EC/EU consumption patterns, in addition to enlargements of the 
Community, have put structural limits on the expansion of the value of ACP exports to the EU. 
It is unlikely that the Community could have unilaterally acted to prevent sustained falls in 
commodity prices during the 1980s and 1990s. Horticulture, fruit, and wine products may have 
been exceptional insofar as there is some evidence that trade was created when ACP imports 
were substituted for domestic EC/EU production and relatively lower prices led to an expansion 
in the quantity of consumption. Likewise, if tourism is to be regarded as an ‘export’, some ACP 
countries have managed to penetrate the European market with some degree of success. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
62 From a welter of various analyses, and in addition to the above references, the following has been 
useful: J. Moss and J. Ravenhill, ‘Trade developments under the first Lomé convention’, World Development 
10(10) 1982 and in Stevens and van Themaat, 1987; D.K. Brown, ‘Trade preferences for developing countries: a 
survey of results, Journal of Development Studies 24(3) 1988; K. Aristoteleous, Europe and Africa: a critical 
appraisal of the trade effects of Lomé I, II, and III, Ohio State University PhD dissertation, 1993; Voutilainen, 1998; 
M. McQueen, C.Phillips, D. Hallam, A. Swinbank, ‘The export record of the ACP countries and the role of trade 
preferences’ (chapter 2 of ACP-EU Trade and Aid Co-operation Post-Lomé), paper for Summit of ACP Heads of 
State and Government, Libreville, 1997 
(http://www.oneworld.org./acpsec/gabon/cwealth/chap2rev.htm). 
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However, these exceptions also prove the rule that import substitution has been trade-diverting 
for ACP exports since, as table 1 shows, non-ACP countries were the beneficiaries of 
substitution.  
Last, but not least, one powerful reason why ACP states have been unable to expand exports 
to the EC/EU through diversification has been the lack of intent and/or capacity on the part of 
those who rule state formations to carry through an industrial policy. During the same period 
that the late-industrialisers of East Asia, for example, carried through policy to this end, the 
economies of virtually all ACP member states have floundered around the official perpetuation 
of an agrarian bias of development.63 At the same time, the private interest of ruling classes, 
groups and those of influence in and around the state have dictated market interventions to 
promote profit making in activities which do not in themselves secure the basis for 
internationally-competitive industrial diversification. The impact of the absence of an industrial 
policy was re-intensified during a period when international terms of trade turned so markedly 
against oil and other industrial raw material importing countries and saw ACP member states, 
especially in Africa, faced with a fundamental constraint of import finance.64 It has been this 
financial gap, inhibiting the import of the prerequisites for industrial diversification, which has 
been regarded as the major proximate factor restraining both development and reinforcing ACP 
aid dependence on international agencies, including those of the EC/EU.  
3.2 Aid 
Lomé, as we have made emphatic above, is fundamentally a means by which the EC/EU has 
paid the insurance premium necessary to mitigate the risks of development through 
international exchange. Whatever the payment of the premium is called, whether ‘development 
co-operation’ or ‘assistance’, it has always taken the form of economic aid, namely the transfer 
of resources from one official source of agency to another. As we also mentioned above, the 
expected worth of the premium, or what is committed as aid, is limited by the willingness of 
the donor to pay. Under the Convention, the EC/EU has a contractual obligation to pay. 
However, the overall amount paid to ACP member states, whether as a whole or severally, is 
not necessarily determined by what, from an ACP standpoint, is needed to be paid. Rather, the 
amount paid is ultimately determined by what the EC/EU member states, severally and 
collectively, deem that they can afford. 
Table 2 below shows that, apart from the period of Lomé II, there has been an increase in the 
absolute volume of EC/EU resources committed to aid. Although Lomé aid resources, 
especially as assembled through the European Development Fund (EDF) and European 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
63 On the issue of agrarian bias in general see M.P. Cowen and R.W. Shenton, ‘Agrarian Doctrines of 
Development: ‘Part I’ and ‘Part II’ Journal of Peasant Studies, 25(2) and 25 (3), 1998; Doctrines of Development, 
London: Routledge, 1996.  
64  See, for example, Ravenhill, 1988, pp. 186, 196–9. 
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Investment Bank (EIB), have formed a relatively small proportion of the total aid of EC/EU 
member states to their ACP counterparts, the increase in the volume of aid after 1986 has 
occurred during a period when, for whatever reason, the European member states’ budgets 
have been under fiscal stress. In view of the priority that is given to domestic spending 
commitments, the question of whether the EC/EU can afford to pay the insurance premium on 
the part of the ACP is largely a matter of politics within Europe. The commitment on the part of 
member states to commit resources to the EDF and EIB, rather than to bilateral aid 
programmes or those of the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), is as much a matter of 
the extent to which the government of a state regards itself as communitaire with respect to 
the Community of Europe as it does with respect to the ‘community of the poor’ in the South.65 
Table 2: Committed EC/EU aid to ACP countries, 1958–1996 
 1958¹ 1964 1971 1976 1981 1986 1990 1996 
 Rome 
Treaty 
Yaoundé 
I 
Yaoundé 
II 
Lomé  
I 
Lomé 
II 
Lomé 
III 
Lomé 
IV 
Lomé 
V 
 EDF1 EDF2 EDF3 EDF4 EDF5 EDF6 EDF7 EDF8 
 eua/ecu million 
Total re-
sources 2 
(at current 
prices) 
581 730 918 3462 5049 8500 12000 14625 
(at constant 
prices) 
534 530 464 1021 913 1224 1377  
 eua/ecu 
EDF per 
capita 
(at constant 
prices) 
9.7 7.7 5.8 4.1 2.6 3.0 2.8  
Sources : Grilli, 1993, table 1.7, p.33; Courier, Jan-Feb 1996. 
Notes 
1. This and all other years refer to when each EDF arrangement came into force, normally for a five-year period. 
2. ‘Total resources’ refers to EDF grants and loans, including STABEX, SYSMIN, and EIB loan capital. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
65  EDF and EIB resources have represented roughly one-half of EU aid; the rest comes from the EU budget 
as negotiated through the Council. For EDF 7 and 8, about one-half of the share of funding was accounted for by 
France and Germany. Taken together, this was slightly more than their share of the EU budget. DG 8, 
Understanding European Community Aid, Brussels, 1998. 
(http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dg08/publicat/odi/eu/ofoc.htm). 
32 — M. P. Cowen / R. W. Shenton / Community Between Europe and Africa — I H S 
 
Table 2 also shows a decline in the real worth of aid per person, perhaps the most important 
unit of resources for the ACP member states, committed by the EC/EU over the period from 
EDF I, which stemmed from the Treaty of Rome, to EDF 7 and 8. This step-wise decline in the 
unit of aid has proceeded most sharply during the 1980s and 90s, precisely when the 
emergence of mass poverty in Africa has been so startling. Given the question of affordability, 
doubtless much can be made of the point that the real worth of aid has stabilised since 1986 at 
roughly three ecu per person. However, there is also little doubt that the gap between what is 
deemed to be affordable and what is deemed to be needed – the deficiency in the insurance 
premium – has also grown immeasurably. On empirical grounds, the declining worth of aid can 
be described simply as the result of the increase in the number of associated states from 20 or 
so during EDF 1 to over 70 in the present Lomé as well as to the increase in the population 
within ACP member states whose human reproduction rates have led, in many cases, to a 
doubling of populations every 15 years or less. However, it does not follow that an explanation 
for the increasing deficiency of the insurance premium can simply be read off from an empirical 
account of the reason why need has increased. To do so would mean a chase of population by 
aid resources that even the most minimally minded Malthusian would find objectionable. Nor, 
given that it is the scale of relative poverty which calls forth a related increase in the insurance 
premium, should it be expected that what can be afforded can be simply inferred from an 
increase in need within the Lomé area on the grounds of increases in population.  
Table 3: Regional distribution of EC/EU aid disbursements, 1986–1995 
 1986–7 1988–9 1990–1 1992–3 1994–5 
 percentage shares 
ACP 63 61 53 48 43 
Asia and Latin America 11 12 11 12 10 
Mediterranean and Middle 
East 
14 11 17 12 11 
CEEC and NIS countries¹ 0 1 13 20 28 
Other and unallocable 12 15 6 8 8 
Source: DG 8, Understanding European Community Aid, Brussels, 1998, table 1.2 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg08/publicat/odi/eu/ofoc.htm) 
Note 
1. Refers to former Central and Eastern European countries of Comecon (CEEC) and the Newly Independent 
States (NIS) of the former Soviet Union. 
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Apart from intra-EU politics, it is the relation between the Community/Union and non-ACP 
areas of the world that has played a part in making Lomé appear increasingly remote and as a 
residual to meeting other needs for aid. There has been so much comment on the panoply of 
frescos surrounding the EU that any more here would be gratuitous.66 However, the worth of 
Lomé aid cannot be abstracted from the interest of the EU in committing aid to where it has 
the kind of need which was spelt out in the DG 8 Guidelines as elements of global 
interdependence. Table 3 shows the extent to which EC/EU aid has moved closer to the 
European continent, especially after 1989 when the massive build-up of aid to the former Soviet 
republics and countries of the Eastern bloc has been at the expense of the ACP area. We may 
be on safe ground in supposing that the opening of markets in the East played some part in 
inducing infrastructural aid but, equally, the commitment to aid is also to be explained by what 
are taken to be threats of armed conflict on EU borders, migration to the Community/Union, 
drug trafficking and environmental degradation. It is interesting that these same proximate 
factors of European ‘insecurity’, and those which stand for what the problem of mass poverty 
makes manifest, appear in the Guidelines for negotiating Lomé V. In other words, the 
justification for the perpetuation of the Convention for the South takes a political perspective 
which is drawn from that of the East, namely the European hinterland which now seems closer 
to the EU than the post-colonial area of the ACP. It is this light that aid can be said to have 
become highly conditioned insofar as it a European political perspective, as expressed by the 
EU which sets some limit to the insurance premium as the effective principle of Lomé.  
Table 4: Sectoral allocation of EC/EU aid commitments to ACP countries, 1986–1995 
 1986–7 1988–9 1990–1 1992–3 1994–5 
      percentage shares 
Programme aid¹ 17 29 30 26 24 
(of which SA) (6) (11) (8) (15) (10) 
Productive sectors² 29 35 18 21 12 
(of which rural) (18) (19) (9) (11) (4) 
Food aid³ 1 7 18 11 12 
Humanitarian aid 2 3 5 5 13 
Economic infrastructure 16 15 18 15 20 
Social infrastructure 5 6 6 12 8 
Other and unallocable 18 5 5 10 11 
Source: DG 8, Understanding European Community Aid (1998), table 3.3. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
66  See, for example, Grilli, 1993, p. 344ff. 
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Notes 
1. Includes funding for Structural Adjustment (SA), Stabex and Sysmin. 
2. Includes cross-sectoral funding for rural development. 
3. Defined as ‘developmental’. 
The change in the portfolio of possible ‘instruments’ through which aid is delivered provide a 
further reason for why Lomé has become highly conditioned as a result of a European political 
perspective. Table 4 firstly shows that the project element of aid, through which development 
finance is invested in directly productive industries and economic infrastructure, has been 
diminished in favour of programme aid. Together with food aid, which has loomed large in EU 
budgeted aid, programme aid was partly designed to enforce policy conditions which counter 
accusations that EC/EU aid has been used to construct ‘cathedrals in the desert’, the 
renowned 1982 aphorism of the Edgard Pisani, the then EC Commissioner for Development 
Co-operation who strove to ‘strike a balance between rigid conditionality imposed by financing 
bodies’, such as the IFIs, ‘and the irresponsibility of non-conditionality’. 67 Pisani’s view was 
that a new direction in EC-ACP relations, giving added stress to interdependence, should make 
them non-political in that instruments of aid would be politically neutral. If policy dialogue with 
each ACP member state over macroeconomic policy, especially in meeting the import gap on 
the external account, was designed to be a non-political process, then it was highly charged 
by a political perspective.  
Akin to what was to later govern the regional distribution of aid, this political perspective of a 
non-political aid process stemmed from the idea that the Community of Europe had its own 
immediate interest in the conditions of development of the South. Beginning with the Ethiopian 
famine and the like of the early 1980s and continuing with the ravages of war, state 
dismemberment and genocide, especially in Africa of the 1990s, a second shift in balance of 
Lomé instruments occurred when food and humanitarian aid, as shown by table 4, came to 
take up a larger proportion of commitments. According to Pisani, who paved the way for Lomé 
III, with its conjunction of policy dialogue and a sectoral emphasis upon the rural of 
development, the responsibility for what were taken to be the publicly obvious failures of 
development had to be shared between the ACP and EU member states. Conditions of 
development certainly entered the politics of intra-European institutional tussles, such as those 
between DG 8 and other DGs within the Commission, and among the Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament, over the volume and direction of development aid resources. However, more 
generally, the question of what was to be afforded as an insurance premium for protection 
against what development might bring in the future, with ACP member states determining what 
the conditions of development might be, was subsumed by one arising out of a popular 
European interest in welfare, made conscious of distress in the South. Therefore, the present 
conditions of development were deemed to require immediate compensation of a kind which 
made aid conditional in the sense that it was accountable to a European imperative for relief. It 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
67 Quoted in Ibid., p. 110.  
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was the perception that conditions of development had undermined the belief in the insurance 
principle of aid which partly made the premium appear to be less affordable for the ACP area. 
This dimension of ‘conditionality’, namely what makes development aid a matter of how the 
conditions of development are perceived outside the South, should be kept in mind as we turn 
to the more usual way of understanding conditionality as a set of prescriptive conditions which 
are imposed upon a ‘recipient’ of aid by its ‘donor’.  
4. Conditionality 
As we showed in our account of Lomé principles, conditionality has been always a necessary 
part of the Convention. Trust, spawned by the obligations of earlier colonial and neo-colonial 
association, necessarily implied unconditionalities such as that it was the duty of the EC to 
provide aid to the ACP while it was the duty of the ACP to promote development. However, 
once the trust relation which created the Convention was set out in a contractual form, it 
followed that its articles legally conditioned the Convention. We are not concerned here with 
the legal conditioning of Lomé, much of which is governed by treaty and thus international 
economic law. Rather, we are interested in policy conditionality which falls into the two broad 
areas of economic and political prescriptions that become linked on grounds of policy and 
according to the case-by-case approach through which conditionality has been imposed. 
Conditionality, it has been argued, ‘can only be said to have been effectively exercised only if a 
recipient country undertakes a policy change it would not have undertaken by itself, that is, 
without the pressure made to bear upon it by the donor. In all other cases, policy change 
cannot be called the result of conditionality – only common agreement, or negotiation’.68 Lomé 
arose out of process of negotiation and, as such, was the result of the unconditionalities 
arising from a relation of trust. However, the trust relation between the EC and ACP partners 
which established the contractual form of development cooperation made conditionality an 
implicit condition for the insurance principle and all that was afforded by way of trade 
preferences and aid. The existence of an implicit condition, namely that it was the duty of ACP 
member states to promote development, followed from the kind of unconditionality mentioned 
earlier. When it became apparent early in the Lomé I period that development was not being 
promoted as expected, then this implicit condition was made increasingly explicit in the form of 
a set of policy prescriptions set out by the EC in successive Lomé negotiations. The 
explication of conditions for the continuance of aid finance – economic conditionality – took 
many forms. However, none of these forms, it is important to note, could be divorced from the 
political of conditionality. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
68 P. Uvin, ‘Do as I say, not as I do’: the limits of political conditionality’, European Journal of Development 
Research 5(1) 1993, p. 68. This standard formulation of conditionality seems to have originated in A.O. Kreuger 
and V.W. Ruttan, The Development Impact of Economic Assistance to LDCs. Volume 1, University of Minnesota for 
USAID and the Department of State, 1983, pp. 2–3.  
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As late as 1989, we reiterate, Lomé IV principles were still being restated as those of ‘equality 
between partners, respect for their sovereignty, mutual interest and interdependence’ and ‘the 
right of each State to determine its own political, social, cultural and economic policy options’. 
For negotiating Lomé V, in 1997, the ACP group’s heads of states continued to declare that 
‘solidarity, sovereignty and equality between partners’ were the cornerstone principles of the 
Convention.69 Previous acknowledgement of the existence of the right of each state to pursue 
its own economic policy options stemmed from what was presumed to be unconditional about 
the sovereignty, or ‘ownership’, of economic policy. Yet, once the ownership of economic policy 
was attached to a particular interest which exercised state power within a state, and the option 
in question was determined by that interest, then the political conditions of sovereignty were 
called into question.  
Political conditions of sovereignty, especially when drawn from the analogue of the individual 
right to self-determination, include presuppositions about the responsibility for incorporating the 
interests of ‘others’ in determining policy options. The interests of’ ‘others’ may be that of 
internal others or may be that of other states including the interests of those of the EC such as 
the conditionality implied by the obligation of ACP states to promote development. Moreover, 
when one particular interest dominates state power to pursue its ‘own’ ends without regard to 
the interests of internal others, then its sovereign power is contested by other interests within 
the state in question. Where class power as the collective representation of interests 
determines policy options, then policy cannot be said to be neutral in the sense that state 
sovereignty constitutes some singular and unconditional source of ownership over all possible 
options. In such a circumstance, no matter to what extent state power is held exclusively and 
exercised absolutely, ‘sovereignty’ becomes diffused. Conditionality here becomes doubly 
political since the issues involved in a political settlement between class interests are called 
into question.70 More specifically, it is the state formation that is called into question. One 
word, corruption, has come be used to sum-up the general effects of what makes for such a 
diffusion of sovereignty. Corruption has been taken to mean the absolute pursuit of a particular 
and private individual or collective interest through the holding and exercise of state power. 
When the rights and responsibilities of ‘ownership’, together with those of the patron-client 
relation, are thus corrupted, the economic and political of conditionality become inseparable.  
4.1 Economic Conditionality 
Lomé was made possible, it has been suggested, because its principles permitted ACP 
member states to adopt their own strategies and policy options for development.71 Strategies 
and policy options refer to a range, and different levels, of intentions about the means and ends 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
69 ACP Heads of State, Libreville Declaration (1997). 
70  For political settlement, which does not mean agreement, see M. Khan, ‘State failure in weak states: a 
critique of new institutionalist explanations in J. Harris, J. Hunter and C.M. Lewis (eds.) The New Institutionalist 
Economics and Third World Development, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 77. 
71  See, especially, Green, 1980. 
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of development. During the 1970s, for example, the maximal range of strategy was supposed 
to have involved an official choice between a socialist and capitalist path of development. At 
this level of intention, Lomé practice was said to be both unconditional and unegotiable insofar 
as the right of an ACP member state to pursue one or other path of development was not open 
to an authoritative source of questioning on the part of the EC. While the ‘choice’ of socialism, 
as it was adopted by the majority of ACP member states in one guise or another, was not 
questionable at the outset of Lomé I, by the mid-1980s, when various socialist experiments in 
policy had for the most part unravelled, Lomé practice was then said to have become 
conditional. At ‘lower’ levels of policy intention, the EC/EU increasingly asserted its right to 
question issues ranging, among others, from whether ACP member states should give priority 
to agriculture rather than industry; taxation against state borrowing; free trade instead of 
protection; the accelerated deregulation, de-nationalisation and liberalisation of markets and 
enterprises; sectoral state expenditure planning in place of project-focused development 
programmes. After Lomé III, the key phrase of policy dialogue signalled a shift in the EC/EU 
stance towards conditionality. In many ways, the DG 8 proposals for Lomé V can be seen as 
the culmination of a process by which the EC/EU has sought to co-determine the common 
course of policy action for an era in which capitalism is not questioned. 
Policy dialogue, in itself, did not necessarily mean conditionality as it was defined above. To be 
conditional, dialogue, through negotiation or the search for ‘common agreement’, had to be 
backed by a sanction that would make the ACP member state ‘partners’ commit themselves to 
policies which they would not undertake of their own accord and without the loss of potential 
aid which the sanction entailed. Secondly, policy dialogue was proposed as an alternative to 
leverage, the earlier practices of the IFIs, and the IMF in particular, which imposed automatic 
conditions upon the recipients of loan finance without necessarily searching for a common 
agreement between the lender and borrower. Yet, the distinction between policy dialogue and 
leverage became hazy because both carried the implication that the donor was inducing the 
recipient to adopt particular policy options. In other words, although the recipient might intend 
to change a policy, and thereby be free from the formal criterion for conditionality, as long as 
effective change could only happen by way of an inducement, the option in question can be 
said to have been levered-up by conditions which were attached by the donor to induce a 
change in policy. 
It is thus significant that policy dialogue appeared in Lomé III together with the induced change 
in policy towards agriculture when the Commission, following resolutions and declarations in 
the Parliament and Council, gave policy priority to food production and security in the ACP area 
and, as table 4 above shows, channelled aid in this direction.72 A consequence of policy 
dialogue in conjunction with giving priority to agriculture was that the Commission, instead of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
72 See P. Raikes, Modernising Hunger: famine, food surplus and farm policy in the EEC and Africa, London: 
James Currey, 1993.  
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ACP member states as was the practice hitherto, now initiated rural development project 
proposals. This change in practice spread to a change in conditions of macroeconomic policy. 
During the early 1980s, for example, DG 8 distanced itself from Structural Adjustment Policy 
(SAP) as induced by the IFIs. Claude Cheysson, the earlier European progenitor of Lomé, like 
Pisani after him, had remarked that ‘Lomé would not be Lomé if it concerns itself with 
adjustment. Lomé is for development.’73Yet, by the end of the 1980s, and as economic 
conditionality entered directly into Lomé IV, the extended sectoral approach adopted by the 
Commission required that an ACP member state enter into a World Bank SAP agreement as a 
condition for EC loan finance.74 A process of accelerated conditionality that occurred during the 
1980s was made possible because of economic conditions within the ACP generally. Due to 
the factors that we mentioned above in relation to trade, the need for aid was increased to 
substitute for the failure of export revenues to meet the gap on the external account of the 
majority of ACP member states. Thus, when the aid gap, between what was deemed by the 
ACP to be needed and what was decreed by the EC member states to be afforded as aid, also 
increased, conditionality became a means of rationing aid resources as much as prescribing 
policy change in general.  
In the literature on economic conditionality, a critical distinction is often made between the 
compulsion of enforcing policy change through a sanction, especially the withdrawal of loan 
finance, and the incentive that should be offered to induce change by encouragement. Despite 
differences in political and ideological persuasion, there seems to be broad agreement among 
various critics of conditionality that the incentive to policy change should always be preferred to 
compulsion. Thus, for the majority of critics of the IFI model of conditionality who also uphold a 
socially positive dimension of development, the EU incentive to induce change as a ‘special’ 
donor should minimally follow the lines of adapting Lomé programmes ‘to the different situation’ 
in each ACP member country and should ‘be sensitive to its social conditions, culture and 
environment’ as well as improving ‘the social and economic well being of the population as a 
whole, reinforce long-term development efforts and be realistic, flexible and adapted to a 
country’s management capacity’ while softening ‘negative social effects’ of conditionality from 
the outset.75 Given the country case-by-case approach, if particular member states do not 
adapt or transform policy according to this constructivist purpose, it is not clear what might 
befall their populations, other than that compulsion is turned away from the model which has 
attached conditions to short-term macroeconomic aggregates and towards those associated 
with direct measures for poverty alleviation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
73 Quoted in Mailafia, 1997, p. 98. 
74  See, among much else, Grilli, 1993, pp. 341–352; Stevens, 1989, pp. 342–5; Ravenhill, 1988, pp. 201–7. 
75 Raffer and Singer, 1996, p. 97. 
In paraphrasing this text from the Lomé IV Convention, Raffer and Singer take it to be implied criticism of IFI 
conditionality.  
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For critics who mainly espouse incentives to induce market-orientated policy reform, and 
object to IFI conditionality as a form of ‘paternalism’, the objection to compulsion rests upon 
the view that policy is a promise rather than a ‘owned’ commitment to reform. As Paul Collier 
and his associates have argued along neo-liberal, anti-regulative lines, sovereign recipient 
states should ‘own’ policies while donors would broadly select Lomé-type programmes for 
recipients according to their economic performance, especially as expressed by the outcomes 
of real GDP growth rates. Countries with the ‘best’ economic performance would then attract 
private capital investment thereby securing conditions for general social improvement.76 Little 
seems to said about what would happen to the worst performers, other than through the 
implications of another perspective that Collier and his associates have advanced for 
negotiating Lomé, and which we briefly mention below.  
In starting from the premise that total EU aid finance sources, let alone Lomé aid programmes, 
are fixed to a degree which cannot match the flexibility which the incentive approach to Lomé 
requires, any form of conditionality entails selectivity. Whether implicitly or explicitly, as in the 
neo-liberal view, selectivity means that there are losers among ACP member states. And since 
conditionality entails selectivity, it therefore has become one foremost means among many to 
distribute a fixed resource of aid finance.77 From the standpoint of the insurance principle of 
Lomé, conditionality may have been designed to entrench the relation between the payment of 
the premium and the extent to which the spread of risk is attached to expected economic 
performance among ACP member states. Yet, the experience of conditionality has also been 
to wrench the premium from risk for any particular country since virtually all member states’ 
policies have come to converge upon imposed EU conditions in their attempts to consciously 
prempt de-selection from aid finance. It is in the light of the experience of conditionality, among 
other factors, that the DG 8 Guidelines for negotiating Lomé V, as well other perspectives, have 
stressed differentiation as a distinctive item on the agenda for negotiation.  
As we saw above, the DG 8 proposal to make ‘differentiated’ trade and aid agreements a major 
aspect of Lomé V arises out of the Commission’s view that regional groupings, through free 
trade associations, offers the best prospect of making Lomé conform to WTO rules. Since one 
major contentious WTO rule at odds with Lomé principles has been that of non-reciprocity with 
regard to trade, the authors of the Guidelines propose that regional agreements would 
‘introduce an element of reciprocity for EU exports’ as ‘a key step on the way to overall 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
76 P.Collier, P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont and J.W. Gunning, ‘Redesigning conditionality’, World Development 
25(9) 1997. 
77  This point is rarely made in the Lomé literature. One exception is T.W. Parfitt and S. Bullock, ‘The prospects 
for a new Lomé Convention: structural adjustment or structural transformation?, Review of African Political 
Economy 47, 1990, p. 109, also see T. Parfitt, ‘The Decline of EurAfrica? : Lomé’s mid-term review’, Review of 
African Political Economy, 67, 1996. 
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liberalisation’.78 Each regional grouping, therefore, would negotiate a separate agreement with 
the EU over the period 2000–2003 and after an overall agreement for Lomé V had been reached 
with the ACP. 79 Regional agreements would be one main way to take into account the degree 
to which different regional groups could be expected to relinquish the Lomé principle of non-
reciprocity. DG 8’s regional proposal has attracted much critical comment, including the view 
that regional differentiation may not be compatible with the different treatment generally 
awarded, including the WTO, to the relatively large group of least less developed countries 
(LLDCs), a significant number of whom are non-ACP member states.80 While it might be 
expected that criteria for differentiating between groups of countries would be inconsistent with 
each other, it is the more general perspective of differentiation that is at issue here.  
In their Libreville Declaration, the ACP Heads of States declared their foremost intent to 
‘strengthen the unity and solidarity of the Group and retain it as a geographical unity’ while also 
subscribing ‘to the principle of positive differentiation and adaptation of cooperation policies and 
actions to the needs and specificities of individual countries and regions’. Or, in both 
welcoming EU support for regional cooperation and insisting that the Union ‘maintain non-
reciprocal trade preferences and market access in a successor agreement’, the ACP 
declaration revealed the extent to which differentiation, inherent in economic conditionality, sits 
so uneasily inside the historically given framework within which the ACP has acted as a form of 
political association.81 By giving differential emphasis to both landlocked states, in Africa, and 
small island states, of the Caribbean and Pacific, as well as giving priority to LLDCs of the 
existing ACP group, the geographical turn of Lomé on the part of the ACP group is one 
alternative way of expressing the historical reluctance to admit to DG 8’s premise that ‘post-
colonial days’ are over.  
Ambiguity towards differentiation, on the part of the ACP group as a whole, lies in the fear that 
regional groupings will be one simultaneous step towards global integration with another 
towards the disintegration of the ACP in favour of north-south trade blocs along the pattern of 
the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Thus, Caricom, like the association of 
Pacific islands ACP member states, would be associated with the EU differently from those of 
African regional free trade associations. This prospect of the end of Lomé carries with it the 
implication that, for Africa at any rate, the older regional perspective of EurAfrica would appear 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
78 For a summary of the economic impact of WTO rules on Lomé, see M. McQueen, C.Phillips, D. Hallam, A. 
Swinbank, ‘ACP-EU relations in a changing world economy’ (chapter 1 of ACP-EU Trade and Aid Co-operation 
Post-Lomé), paper for Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government, Libreville, 1997. 
79 DG 8, Guidelines (1997), pp. 24–5. 
80  See, for example, ECDPM, ‘What future for ACP-EU trade relations?’ Lomé Negotiating Brief 1, Maastricht: 
ECDPM, 1998, Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, ‘Lomé: from model to misfit but is a better 
deal on the cards’, Development Research Insights for Policymakers 24, 1997.  
81  ACP Heads of State, Libreville Declaration (1997). 
The debate over differentiation was also played out at an ACP workshop held in Brussels during April 1997. See 
ACP Secretariat, ‘Conclusions of the workshop on ACP perspectives on future ACP-EU cooperation’ 
(ACP/28/040/97), Brussels, 1997. 
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in a new guise. In a series of policy proposals, Collier and his free-trade proselytisers have 
taken this perspective to its logical extreme by using NATFA as a template for how regional 
associations would be one-step towards trade and monetary integration with the EU. At the 
centre of their proposals lies the conviction that it is only through north-south trade and 
monetary integration that the risk of private investment in the South will be minimised. In 
thereby eschewing the significance of the Lomé aid insurance principle, with its premium 
payments cast as vestiges of colonial paternalism, the free traders, as mentioned above, have 
also recast the conditionality of development. Far from abjuring conditionality, Collier and his 
associates have asserted that free trade areas, with reciprocal arrangements, act to make it 
possible for policy reform to be locked in through commitments to deregulate trading and 
monetary interests which confer profitable but resource-inefficient advantages to politically 
vested business interests.82 These free trade proposals have been regarded with some 
enthusiasm in influential quarters. 
Thus, we have been informed that, according to the EU Commission, regional groupings 
through free trade associations are of benefit to the ACP group because they ‘lock-in’ 
economic reforms in ‘providing reforming governments with a good excuse vis-à-vis domestic 
vested interests and lobbies to implement unpopular measures’. Thus, the EU would ‘play the 
role of an agency of restraint or reform anchor for ACP countries. This means that the threat of 
sanctions/retaliations by the EU would deter governments from breaking commitments made 
under free trade agreement (by reinstalling barriers to imports from Europe)’.83 Given the 
external political implausibilities of the injunction for regional cooperation, as mentioned earlier, 
and the expressed ambivalence of the ACP group towards the perspective of differentiation, 
together with changes in the international economic climate during 1998, it is hardly surprising 
that DG 8 should have recently softened its earlier stringent insistence on the paramountancy 
of free trade associations as an element of conditionality.84 One other reason for scepticism 
may also be the realisation that ‘reforming governments’, especially in Africa, do not face 
vested interests as if they were separate from the ruling agency of government. Corruption, as 
we mentioned, is what binds the economic to the political of conditionality and it is towards 
what any ‘agency of restraint’ has to confront that we now turn.  
4.2 Corruption 
While a public interest in corruption has become pervasive in the North as much as the South 
during the 1990s, with the EU Commission itself allegedly insinuated in corrupt practices, it 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
82  For example, P. Collier and J.W. Gunning, ‘Trade policy and regional integration: implications for relations 
between Europe and Africa’, World Economy 18(3) 1995; P. Collier, P. Guillaumont, S. Guillaumont and J.W. 
Gunning, ‘The future of Lomé: Europe’s role in African growth, World Economy 20(3) 1997. For an application of 
this perspective to South Africa, see C.Jenkins and W. Naude, ‘Reciprocity in trade relations between South 
Africa and Europe’, Development South Africa 13(1) 1996. 
83  Lecomte, 1998, p. 9. 
84 Ibid., p. 10. 
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has been especially regarded as both one major cause for poor economic performance and the 
barrier against inducing economic reform in the ACP group.  85 Economic conditionality has 
been used, especially during the 1990s, as a means to induce governments to act against 
corruption. Contrawise, the attempt to induce economic reform through incentives has been 
resisted because the incentives for economic gain are less than those which corruption offers 
for those holding public office at the highest levels of the state and who are responsible for 
making decisions about economic reform. Put most simply, corruption is the use of a public 
office to promote a private benefit. For corruption to have a specific meaning, it presupposes 
that an economic sphere, in which active, private and individual self-interest is paramount, is 
distinct from that of a public, political sphere of life. If a principle of public life, and the office 
that goes with it, is public service, then corruption is said to have undermined the principle by 
which state resources are mobilised and distributed.  
The problem that arises is when corruption is regarded as a system of government rather than 
merely a procedure through which the social potential of a public benefit is appropriated by 
individual holders of public office, usually in the form of a bribe or graft. In his classic 1968 
account of the problem, Stanislav Andreski wrote that the ‘use of public office for private 
enrichment is the normal and accepted practice in African states and the exceptions are few 
and not inconclusive’. While he was very conscious of showing that ‘there is no justification to 
regard venality as something peculiarly African’ and ‘the impunity thereto as typically 
European’, Andreski insisted that the ‘newly independent African states provide some of the 
closest approximations to pure kleptocracy that have been recorded’. Kleptocracy, he 
continued, constitutes ‘the main fount of inequality and exploitation’ in Africa.86 One implication 
following from Andreski, and which he was inclined to make, has been to underwrite an 
emphasis which has been put upon community and civil society as an alternative means, to 
that of state development, by which development should be carried out in Africa.  
In his seminal 1975 article on the two publics in Africa, Peter Ekeh claimed that the indigenous 
African bourgeoisie, as a class, was reared in the ‘civil public’ realm, that of government 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
85  During October 1998, to take the latest example, it was reported that the ‘lid threatens to blow off the 
simmering stew of Brussels scandals … with the European Commission under pressure to establish an 
independent body to investigate frauds and mismanagement, rather than conduct internal enquiries which are 
then kept secret’. ‘Threat to block EU budget over fraud’, The Guardian (London) October 5 1998. 
More generally, during the past two years, an exceptional welter of material has appeared on corruption. Texts, 
especially collected editions of essays, include the following: J. Girling, Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy, 
London: Routledge, 1997; K. A. Elliot (ed.) Corruption and the Global Economy, Washington D.C.: Institute for 
International Economics, 1997; M. Levi and D. Nelken (eds.) The Corruption of Politics and the Politics of 
Corruption, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996; P. Heywood (ed.) Political Corruption, Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. For further 
back, also see R. Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.  
For an overview of Africa, see R. Williams, Political Corruption in Africa, Aldershot: Gower, 1987, also, S.P. Riley 
‘The political economy of anti-corruption strategies in Africa’, European Journal of Development Research 10(1) 
1998. The issue of this journal was devoted to corruption.  
86 S. Andreski, The African Predicament: a study in the pathology of modernisation, London: Michael Joseph, 
1968, pp. 94, 106, 107. 
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institutions created by the colonial administration and extended into the post-colonial period. 
However, it was the ‘primordial public’ realm of indigenous institutions, ‘groupings and ties’, 
namely the ‘native sector’, which governed the private morality of individual Africans who 
assumed post-colonial state power. The Western educated African did not completely escape 
the ‘native sector’. Indeed his greatest difficulty was, and remains, the simultaneous adaptation 
to two mentally contraposing orders. One solution to this problem formulated by the educated 
African is to define one of these orders in moral terms and the other in amoral terms. The 
‘native sector’ has become a primordial reservoir of moral obligations, a public entity which one 
works to preserve and benefit. The Westernized sector has become an amoral civic public from 
which one seeks to gain, if possible in order to benefit the moral primordial public. Ekeh’s 
economic conclusion was that ‘the individual’s relationship with the civic public is measured in 
material terms – but with a bias’: ‘While the individual seeks to gain from the civic public, there 
is no moral urge to give back to the civic public in return for his benefits. Duties, that is, are de-
emphasised while rights are squeezed out of the civic public with the amorality of an artful 
dodger.’ And, then, the holder of public office in the civil public extracts largesse to distribute it 
within the primordial public where duty is made paramount by the sanction of ‘community’. 87 
This perspective of the problem of corruption has become pervasive in general argument about 
the African perspective of the predicament of the African state and society.88  
Ekeh’s own prescription was to alleviate corruption by bringing morality into the civic public. 
During the 1980s, a different view has asserted the authority of the primordial public by 
regarding it as synonymous with civil society. By thereby turning civil society into the idea of 
the community, it is easy to see why African ‘communities’ should come to be seen as the 
repositories of values which anchor social action generally. When filled with the content of 
ethnic identities, in particular, the primordial course of social action then comes to determine 
the grounds of political action. Much confusion has then centered on distinguishing between 
when the ethnicity of tribe is to be regarded as a beneficent rather than maleficent force for 
development. 89  
Another implication that follows from Andreski’s conception of ‘kleptocracy or corruption as a 
system of government’ is that corruption is the systemic means by which the primary 
accumulation of capital can be secured through the state apparatus as a whole. When those 
who rule the state regard state resources and institutions as an arena for the appropriation of 
private benefit, then the purpose of public office is corrupted. Ekeh’s ‘dialectical acme’ of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
87  P. P. Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: a theoretical statement’, Comparative Studies in 
History and Society 17(1) 1975, pp. 92, 100,107,110. 
88  To give just one example here: Michael Bratton (‘Beyond the state: civil society and associational life in 
Africa’, World Politics 51(3) 1989, pp. 413–4) noticed the connection between what he called Goran Hydén’s 
‘pathbreaking insights’ on the ‘uncaptured peasantry’ and ‘the economy of affection’ and Ekeh’s earlier 
perspective. Hydén was a very significant figure at the interface between the academy and international donor 
agencies.  
89 See, for example, A. Campbell, ‘Ethical ethnicity: a critique’, Journal of Modern African Studies 35(1) 1997. 
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corruption, as he called it, can be then stood on its head since active individual self-interest is 
what generally gives reason for the bourgeois interest in state power. It is not so much that the 
figurative African bourgeois is mentally disorientated by simultaneously occupying two public 
positions as that an indigenous class of capital has been formed through the straddling of its 
individual persons between the two orientations, that of public service and business, during the 
course of both the colonial and post-colonial history. Colonial government circumscribed the 
racial limit of the civic public, to generally keep African aspirations for property and business, 
confined within the primordial public. Post-colonial government, therefore, made the domain of 
state power one of an uncivil public because active self-interest and the state authority of the 
civil public, or civil society, ran together. 90 
There is no disputing the point that largesse is grabbed within the uncivil public realm of 
unaccountable state power. Nor do we contend that largesse is not used to ‘perpetuate and 
benefit’, if not create and extend, the communities of the primordial public. What we do argue, 
however, is political action in, and for, the primordial public is based upon self-interest 
developed within the uncivil public realm. This is why the attitude of those who rule so many 
ACP member states are ambivalent towards the largesse which Lomé affords by virtue of the 
transfer of resources according to the insurance principle. Whereas the donor’s premise of aid 
is that social insurance is to be distributed through public service, the official recipients, by 
way of the above account of corruption, take it to be the potential source of revenue to serve 
both a private economic and public political interest in the civil and primordial publics. By this 
reckoning, the ‘patrons’ of largesse within their own domains are not prepared to be the 
‘clients’ of Lomé unless the largesse appears on the terms which permit their active self-
interests to be expressed. These terms include the implicit understanding that as ‘equal 
partners’, the ACP ‘patrons’ have the right to create rights, involved in the ‘ownership’ of 
development cooperation resources, over the resources generated by the insurance principle. 
For the EU to declare war on corruption is tantamount to curbing the internal patrimonial rights 
which accompany the external relation of clientage that is meant to inhere in Lomé.  
The DG 8 Guidelines for negotiating Lomé V bring corruption to the fore thus: 
Like the rule of law, good governance is crucial to social development and alleviating poverty 
as it is to building up investment and the private sector. In the revised Lomé Convention, this 
concept, now a leitmotif in the international debate on development aid, refers to the 
transparent and responsible management of a country’s resources (human, natural, economic 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
90 For the Kenya case, see M. Cowen and S. MacWilliam Indigenous Capital in Kenya: the ‘Indian’ dimension 
of debate, Helsinki, Interkont Books 8, 1996 and M. Cowen and M. Ngunyi, ‘Preludes to the 1992 and 1997 
elections in Kenya: Reconciling reform within a chain of events’, University of Helsinki Institute of Development 
Studies Working Paper 10/97, 1997. 
An overview of similar approaches to this implication of corruption can be found in E. Harsch, ‘Accumulators and 
democrats: challenging state corruption in Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies 31(1) 1993. 
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and domestic and external financial resources) for the purposes of economic and social 
development.91 
The authors of the Guidelines then make it clear that good governance ‘encompasses fighting 
corruption and is fostered by participate approaches’, including agreement on the ‘principles’ 
which the EU and ACP ‘partners’ might decide to include in a common endeavour to fight 
corruption. For itself, DG 8 set out ‘three lines of action’ to deal with corruption. Preventive 
measures, such as legal procedures, special programmes and the ‘inclusion of a good 
governance clause in every cooperation agreement’ may have been intended as the courses of 
action which took economic conditionality to the limit within the existing Lomé principles of 
equality and sovereignty.92 However, in themselves, the intended actions against corruption 
regard corruption as if it were a question of procedure rather than the systematic form of 
government within an appreciable number of ACP member states. It is for this reason that 
economic conditionality, ending with an injunction to good governance, presupposed and further 
opens up the conditionality of the political, where a change in the form of government is sought 
to fight corruption.  
4.3 Political Conditionality  
Political conditionality is, in short, the attempt to induce or enforce democratic practices upon 
a state regime or regimes that are deemed to be undemocratic. The criteria for democracy 
have normally followed liberal democratic precepts including multiparty electoral processes as 
well as freedoms of speech, assembly and association. While these precepts have been set 
out as principles or ideal norms stemming from a universal conception of human rights, 
democratic practice can also be interpreted as a set of procedures which make possible what 
has come to be called ‘good government’. While ‘good governance’ carries with it a 
presupposition that democratic practice is necessary for good economic performance, we 
assume here that good government should be regarded as a principled end in itself. If liberal 
democratic precepts do stem from a set of principles, then improved economic performance, 
however understood or measured, does not necessarily follow from their practice.  
Whether by way of ideals or procedures, liberal precepts of democracy are to be distinguished 
from those of popular democracy. Popular democracy rests upon, in addition to liberal 
precepts, what David Beetham has called a process of ‘collectively binding decision-making’ 
wherein ‘popular control and political equality’ are ideals governing the extent to which 
democratic process can be said to be realised.93 It will be immediately noticed that it is the 
principles of popular democracy which are those that have governed the Lomé Convention. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
91  DG 8, Guidelines (1997), p. 13. 
92  Ibid., p.13; also, COM (97) 192 of May 21 1997 where the principles of action to fight corruption are laid 
out in detail.  
93 D. Beetham, ‘Conditions for Democratic Consolidation’, Review of African Political Economy 60, 1994, p. 
159.  
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Political conditionality has been made problematic by the contention that the wider meaning of 
democratic practice, that of the Convention, has been obviated by the one-sided attempt to 
induce or enforce liberal democratic procedures of good government, let alone good 
governance, upon ACP member states whose status is to be regarded as the political equal of 
those of the EC/EU group and who are meant to be engaged in collective decision making with 
them.  
Olave Stokke concluded his fairly recent exposition on the ‘Core issues and the state of the 
art’ of political conditionality by stating that ‘Good government can be enforced from outside 
only in exceptional cases’.94 One of his two cases of the enforcement of good government, 
West Germany, is instructive because the second world war was the foremost historical reason 
for the construction of the EC/EU, the same Community which has attempted to enforce ‘good 
government’ upon ACP member states, especially the African members of the Group.  
If, as according to Stokke, good government has been enforced only exceptionally from 
outside, then it has been through war and as a result of the military occupation and 
administration of the country in question. The attempt to enforce good government through war 
and military occupation has featured strongly in the post-colonial experience of Africa and the 
Caribbean. Of present ACP member states, Grenada, Haiti and Somalia have been invaded by 
the military forces of the United States which sought to replace ‘bad’ with ‘good’ governments 
or install governments where states had disintegrated. UN military peacekeeping missions 
have operated, often with strong representation by EC/EU member states and sometimes 
alongside UN civil missions, in a number of other countries. Of the former colonial powers, 
France has intervened by military means across a range of francophone African states. 
Belgium has intervened in the former Zaire and in the African intra-lacustrine states, while 
Britain acted in1964 against a military coup in Tanzania and put down a contemporaneous 
army mutiny in Kenya. More recently, attempts to enforce good government in Africa through 
military means have become an intra-ACP affair. Examples include the action of Tanzanian 
forces in Uganda that brought an end to the Amin regime; that of Ugandan forces in Rwanda 
after the 1994 genocide and ensuing Rwandan intervention in the former Zaire less than two 
years later; ECOWAS intervention in Liberia; and, most recently, war by Nigerian forces 
against ‘the lumpenproletariat warlords’ of Sierra Leone. In most of these cases, the 
intervention of African military forces in neighbouring states have been given open or at least 
tacit support by United States and/or EC/EU member states. However, as the cases of 
Rwanda and the former Zaire illustrate, EU states have been sometimes been divided between 
one or other of the contending military forces. In particular, France appears to have pursued an 
interest akin to the old dispute between the regionalists and globalists of the first Lomé that 
has conflicted with that of British and other member states positions in the region.  
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Political Conditionality, London: Frank Cass, 1995, p. 82. 
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Warfare, which has proceeded apace in Africa in the 1990s, is highlighted here because it and 
other military action is often ignored or regarded as something other than what is intended by 
the use of the term political conditionality. This oversight is often due to administrative and 
academic conventions that de- and compartmentalises ‘international relations’ in which the 
discourse about and evaluations of war games feature critically as sanctions in the art of 
diplomacy. The discourse of war is separated from that of ‘international development’ in which 
people of a more generally pacifist disposition gather to do good works throughout the world. 
More substantially, it is generally little appreciated that war and its outcomes are the pursuit of 
political conditionality by other means. While political conditionality suggests that the political 
is a means, through dialogue rather than war or elections rather then violence, to achieve 
conditions of good government, conditionality of the political indicates that the political is the 
end of whatever means are undertaken to achieve good government.  
The recognition of the importance of warfare highlights the reality that the conditionality of the 
political is normally about attempts to enforce a change in the ruling regime of the state or 
territory in question. War is necessarily an affair carried out against existing ruling power and 
the extent to which a war is won normally determines whether a given political regime of the 
vanquished survives or not. Political conditionality, on the other hand, is far more ambiguous. It 
may be inferred that acts of the political are intended to induce a regime change, but the 
conditions by which change is enforced make no explicit reference to a change of regime. For 
Lomé, whose principles place such a premium on state sovereignty and self-determination, this 
point is vital because these principles were basic to the trust relation that was implicit in the 
founding of the Convention, its continuation, and extension. Furthermore, the proposed new 
political contract as the putative motif for Lomé V as intended by the EU Commission, 
reinforces this trust relation as the general condition for why the perpetuation of the Convention 
can be contemplated. 
One generally impression given by literature on the experience of political conditionality during 
the 1990s ranges from highly qualified scepticism to downright objection. Gordon Crawford 
provides one relatively mild example of objection to Lomé conditionality takes when he argues 
that: 
It is somewhat ironic and disappointing that respect for human rights and democracy, for which 
there is almost universal support, should have played such a key rôle in tilting the balance of 
power away from the South. 
After making the point that Lomé continues to serve as the template for development 
cooperation, Crawford continues:  
The commitment to human rights and democracy could be implemented through joint decision-
making agreements, with clear operational criteria and procedures, and a system for 
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monitoring and evaluating performance where necessary. A basic prerequisite, however, would 
be precisely what appears to be lacking: a continued EU commitment to the founding 
principles of partnership, equality and mutual respect.95  
An example of the sceptical view comes from Stokke who concludes generally that ‘self-
sustained development cannot be created or driven from the outside’, and more specifically, 
that if encouragement for development is ‘not attuned to endogenous processes, intervention 
may even be detrimental to those objectives. The same applies to pressures from outside 
intending to create good government’.96 Another example of the conventional wisdom maintains 
that political conditionality ‘is not and cannot be effective, contrary to the beliefs of both its 
advocates and critics’.97 In other words, neither war, nor any other means of political 
conditionality will achieve the conditionality of the political when the historical conditions for the 
case in question are not conducive to the end in view. In view of the above, it is necessary to 
examine how and why political conditionality became part of Lomé conventions. 
4.4 Human Rights and Multiparty Elections 
Human rights first became a contentious issue during the 1978/9 negotiations for Lomé II when 
the EC Commission attempted to incorporate Articles 3 and 5 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights as a preamble to the Convention. Although the issue first arose due to gross 
human rights abuse in cases such as Idi Amin’s Uganda, which embarrassed the EC as a 
donor, Green suggests that this proposal was a ‘throwaway’ ploy designed to ward off 
economic demands made by the ACP group negotiators.98 Be that as it may, human rights 
clauses appeared for the first time in the Lomé III convention negotiated during the mid-1980s. 
This was the period during which human rights abuse was heightened for a number of African 
states, including the significant cases of Kenya and Ghana. However, the Lomé III clauses 
formally certified that the EC regarded South African apartheid as an affront to human dignity 
and opposed racial discrimination in Europe against students and immigrants.99 It was not until 
Lomé IV, and especially its mid-term review of the mid-1990s, that human rights and 
democratic procedures formally entered into the Convention as part of an essential elements 
clause ‘allowing the partial or total suspension of the convention in the event of serious violation 
of the principles of democracy, human rights or the rule of law’.100 Yet, by this time, the kind of 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
95  Crawford, 1996, p. 516. 
96  Stokke, 1995, p. 82. 
97  Uvin, 1993, p. 68. 
98  Ravenhill, 1980, p. 48; Green, 1980, p. 17. 
99 C. Stevens, ‘ECP-ACP: from Lomé III to Lomé IV’ in H. Färber et al, African Development Perspectives 
Yearbook 1989. Volume 1: human dimensions of adjustment, Berlin: Schelzky & Jeep, pp. 337–8. 
100 Raffer and Singer, 1996, p. 100. 
It was only in March 1991 that the EC adopted a policy of political conditionality when the then DG 8 presented a 
report to the European Parliament advocating ‘the integration of our development assistance in an external policy 
promoting democracy, the state of law, and respect for human rights’. Three months later, the Council concurred 
and aid to 20 countries, virtually all ACP member states, was reduced or cut. It was, however, the Parliament 
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human rights abuse that was so prevalent across a range of ACP member states during the 
1970s and 80s had largely receded while formal advances in liberal democratic procedures, 
including the holding of multiparty elections, had been registered for most ACP member states.  
It might seem that Lomé political conditionality was applied after the horse has bolted rather 
than when it was affronted. If there is any ‘irony’ in the application of the political clauses of the 
Convention, it is that, from the point of view of opposition movements within ACP countries, 
they have been so long delayed in their application to the state regimes that undertake Lomé 
negotiations. At the 1978/9 negotiations, we are told, ACP states regarded the EC human 
rights proposal, among others, as ‘hostile to their interests’ and ‘perceived as unwarranted 
interference in areas of ACP sovereignty’.101 By 1997, the ACP heads of state were able to 
freely declare that they attached ‘considerable importance not only to the fight against poverty 
that besets our peoples, but also to the development of a society where human dignity is 
paramount. We, therefore reaffirm our commitment to the values of democracy, good 
governance, the rule of law and respect for human rights’.102 The fact that it took 15 years or so 
to put the conditionality of the political into the Convention may be partly the result, rather than 
a cause as is suggested by Crawford, of the shift in the balance of power against ACP state 
regimes vis-à-vis the EC/EU.  
If the balance of power between the two Lomé groups has shifted away from the ACP group 
then this has been for the reasons of economic conditionality addressed above. Yet, part of the 
process by which economic conditionality has come to be enforced owe much, as we have 
also seen, to the increased power of non-EC/EU donors and the IFIs in particular. As, over the 
course of time, the relative economic dependence of the ACP on the Convention has 
weakened, the influence of the IFIs on EC/EU policy formation has increased, especially as far 
as setting the terms of political conditionality is concerned. The objection to conditionality on 
the part of the EC/EU has usually involved or implied some contention that the associative 
relation that inheres in Lomé and its tradition of EurAfrica should make the Convention different 
from the relation that binds ACP member states to the IFIs. From the political perspective of 
negotiating Lomé V, it is therefore worth bearing in mind the view of Crawford, quoted above, 
that political like economic conditionality should be subject to Lomé principles, including the 
co-determination of procedures resting on principles of equality, partnership and mutual 
respect.  
 
rather than Commission that took the initiative in acting upon the conditionality of the political. See Uvin, 1993, pp. 
66–7.  
101  Ravenhill, 1980, p. 48. 
102  ACP Heads of State, Libreville Declaration (1997). 
The obvious charge that the heads of state included a number of whom paid scant practical regard at home for 
what they were formally signing abroad misses the point that unlike two decades previously, they now 
considered that they had to sign up to what they hitherto found so repugnant.  
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It is the ´sovereignty’ of the partner in question, especially that of a relatively non–democratic 
member state, that is the problem when the agency of the state appears as a partner co-
determining the means by which democratic practice is to be encouraged. Thus, political 
conditionality has a very specific meaning in that it holds to the view that democratic principles 
cannot be enforced or induced but encouraged according to a negotiated agreement with the 
very partner who is responsible for why the conditionality of the political arises in the first place. 
It is here that the difference between a political settlement and agreement arises to explain 
why political conditionality took so relatively long to arrive in the Lomé convention.  
One hallmark of political conditionality in Africa has been the advent of multiparty politics and 
elections through which, it was hoped that democratic practices could be embedded in one-
party, authoritarian state structures. According to various reform movements which appeared in 
most African countries from the late 1980s, authoritarian one-party regimes were to be 
succeeded by ‘the restoration of democracy’ or ‘multiparty democracy’, the platforms from 
which the first opposition parties were mostly launched to contest the multiparty elections of 
the early 1990s. Simultaneously, from the standpoint of international donor agencies, including 
the EC/EU, political liberalisation was regarded as a condition for economic liberalisation with 
both presented as means for improved economic performance, growth and development.  
Internal opposition movements within ACP member states, often alongside violent political 
action, ensured the conditions for political settlement which then made it possible for 
conditionality to appear as a means to negotiate conditions for human rights and multiparty 
politics.103 
After nearly a decade of the new ‘wave of democracy ‘ in Africa, it is now possible to evaluate 
the extent to which multiparty politics and elections have achieved the intended purpose of 
political liberalisation. For both internal and external agencies of reform, multiparty elections 
were not merely about a contest between two or more political parties which offered the basis 
for rational choice on the part of a figurative individual voter. Elections were to serve as a means 
of change in regime, involving a different approach to state government, or what has been called 
‘governance’. As an alternative to violent change, through a coup or revolution, elections were to 
legitimate a change in regime and make a new regime, through successive elections, 
accountable for policy. It is from these standpoints that issues of human rights and multiparty 
research findings are to be addressed. Recent research has shown that incumbent regimes, 
whose ruling parties won the first multiparty election during the 1990s, have learned to live with 
multiparty politics. Or, to put it the other way around, opposition parties have found it difficult to 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
103  See Khan, 1995, p. 77: 
Khan argues that it is ‘the balance of power between classes and groups’ affected by state institutions and 
which determines change within the state that amounts to a political settlement. Therefore, insofar as this balance 
varies from case to case, the point is that the effective application of conditionality, when informed by the same 
precepts, will also vary across ACP member states.  
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win parliamentary and presidential elections during the new ‘wave of democracy’ in Africa.104 
Secondly, there is marked variation in the degree to which elections have been keenly fought. 
Some recent multiparty elections have been as closely and keenly fought as the first multiparty 
elections of the 1990s. Others have been marked by voter apathy. Yet, thirdly, whatever the 
extent to which incumbent regimes have been to face off opposition parties during elections, it 
has generally been the case that multiparty elections have both widened and deepened the 
space for public political activity and expression. 
Generally, multiparty elections have extended the area for public political activity insofar as 
they have emerged out through political reform which was partly led by the demand for 
freedoms of political expression. While there have been cases in which gains won in the early 
1990s have been reversed (Nigeria, Zambia), reversals have been contested through sets of 
institutions, including the media, which have come to form the political basis of the much 
vaunted ‘civil society’ in Africa. In other cases (Kenya, Ghana), it has been the prelude to 
elections when electoral and political reform has been progressively furthered and often 
violently so. It is this finding which suggests a limited ‘democratic break’ between the one- and 
multi-party periods, and one, which it is so often asserted, has provided the political space for 
an arena of civil society to become the programmatic hope, especially of international donor 
agencies, for the embedding of liberal democratic practices as well as curtailing corruption in 
the ACP area generally.  
4.5 Civil Society 
The DG 8 Guidelines opened with the claim that the construction of the European Community 
rested on the same foundations as those envisaged for the new political contract of Lomé V:  
The participatory and transparent method adopted by the Commission in the discussion of a 
policy so tightly bound up with the building of Europe has laid the foundations for a new and 
open partnership, in which civil society, businesses, social players and local authorities all 
have an active role. 105 
Civil society is presented as a key issue. Thus, when the authors of the Guidelines turned to 
poverty alleviation by putting it at the cornerstone of the ‘new partnership’ of the envisioned 
Lomé V, through an ‘integrated approach’ combining the economic of markets with the social 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
104 Research was conducted through the Elections in Africa project of the Institute of Development Studies, 
University of Helsinki between 1996 and 1998 for 14 countries. There was no case in which opposition parties 
won a general election or significantly gained at other elections studied as part of this project. This finding 
contrasts with the fact that the first multiparty elections, at the beginning of the 1990s, changed the ruling party 
for as many as 14 out of the 35 former one-party regimes. See M. Cowen and L. Laakso, ‘Elections in Africa: a 
provisional overview of the IDS project’, University of Helsinki Institute of Development Studies Unpublished Paper, 
June 1998; M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: regime transitions in comparative 
perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
105  DG 8 Guidelines (1997), p. 3. 
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dimension of economic growth, they immediately raised the idea civil society. ‘Political backing 
for a framework conducive to equal opportunities and the emergence of an active and organised 
civil society’, the authors wrote, ‘will be part and parcel of such an approach’.106 Two 
interrelated implications of civil society can be gleaned from the guidelines. The first, arising 
from the integrated approach towards poverty alleviation, is that civil society stands for what 
can reconcile the freedom of private enterprise with the social impact of untrammelled 
economic growth upon employment, the provision of basic services, such as health and 
education, and the environment. Civil society, accordingly, both validates the freedom of private 
enterprise from state regulation while it is through civil society that the unemployment, deficient 
social provision, a degraded environment and discrimination against women are to be 
countered. A strong implication of this meaning of civil society is that it is the means by which 
social order is regulated.  
Secondly, when referring to ‘institutional development’, the Guidelines affirm that DG 8 intends 
to ‘back the organisation of civil society and strengthen social players’: 
Cooperation could help them gather their forces – without undermining their quest for new 
methods of representation and dealing with the authorities – and encourage exchanges of 
experience, in particular on a South-South or regional basis. Besides[,] human rights 
associations, trade unions, consumer associations…, trade associations, producer 
associations, women’s associations, youth organisations, children’s organisations and 
environmental protection movements will benefit.107  
Thus, it is implied that ‘the organisation of civil society’ consists of a number of associative 
organisations whose relation to each other is established by their common membership of 
what is presumed to be an entity that is called civil society. In proposing the organisation of an 
active civil society, the implication is that associations, when of civil society, are deemed to be 
independent of the state whereas the organising of civil society is implicated in the authority of 
the state. From the quote given above, DG 8 pleads that ‘political backing’ be given to the 
framework in which civil society is active and organised. Elsewhere in the Guidelines, it is 
clearly stated that the ‘emergence of civil society’, along with ‘opportunities for all members of 
society’ must be fostered in a ‘political environment’ and that ‘there must be recognition and 
backing’ for the two implications of civil society – the relation between that of private enterprise 
and the social dimension and its constitutive organisations. 108Since it is the state which 
awards recognition to both, the Guidelines only reveal the contradiction that has long been part 
of the concept of civil society.109 
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107  Ibid., p. 20. 
108  Ibid., p.16. 
109  As shown in Cowen and Shenton, 1998.  
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This logical contradiction, between the voluntary associating of people in organisations of civil 
society and the plea that the ACP member states permits an political environment in which civil 
society can be actively organised, poses any a number of practical difficulties for implementing 
the new political contract proposed for Lomé V. Were it to be supposed that real content could 
be given to the abstract conception of an active and organised civil society, the following 
difficult problems, among others, immediately arise. The first is that there are an infinite 
number of associations that have the potential to be of civil society. Churches and religious 
movements, ethnic or tribal associations, social movements, and political organisations and 
parties are not mentioned in the DG 8 list of associations. Yet, throughout the ACP area, the 
‘missing’ associations have often been the most-self conscious organisations of civil society, 
upholding the motif of ‘the civil society’ against ruling state regimes in the cause of political and 
social reform. From the 1980s, as during the colonial period, these were often the associations 
which attempted to force intransigent state regimes to engage in the kind of reforms that make 
possible the new political contract as envisaged by DG 8. Insofar as these associations were 
in opposition to ruling state regimes, it is not difficult to explain why they do not appear in a list 
designed to persuade ACP member states of the virtues of a new political contract.  
A second difficulty is that whether or not associations are in opposition to state regimes or 
sponsored by them, associative organisations are more often than not formed through an 
antagonistic relation to each other. If their relation between each other is one of inherent 
conflict, then the presumed common membership of what is called civil society only makes 
sense if the same ‘civil society’ mediates between organisations and regulates conflict. 
However, it is the authority of the state that stands in the name of civil society to regulate 
conflict. The language of ‘participation’, ‘transparency’ and ‘stakeholding’, so prevalent in the 
kind of approach advocated by DG 8, is used as part of a plea to make state agency mediate 
conflict as if it was part of civil society rather than a singular source of authority which imposes 
its own political will, and particular interest, upon the people of a territory at large. The difficulty 
is that, other through the conditionality of the political, an external agency such as the EU 
does not possess the internal force that a state employs to mediate conflict and thereby 
determine which interest will prevail over another within the organised conception of civil 
society.  
Thirdly, the idea of civil society has been invoked as the major means to fight corruption, and 
especially so as a system of government. As we showed above from the experience of Africa 
during the multiparty period of the 1990s, elections in themselves have not guaranteed a 
change in a state regime, and especially one that leads to a different system of government. 
Political conditionality remains as conditions for ‘good government’ and not what be guaranteed 
as the end of both the same and ‘good governance’. Likewise, as we have seen, economic 
conditionality may have been the means to realise the conditions for economic development 
through the pre-conditions of good governance. But there has been no assurance that the 
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precepts of liberal democracy and/or development can be conditioned by the application of 
either political or economic conditionality towards particular ACP member states in question.  
Experiences of the 1990s, especially in Africa, tell us that the democratic ‘break’, which has 
been achieved by the conjunction of internal and external pressures for political reform, has 
opened up the two implications of civil society in such a way that corruption as a system of 
government has been as much reinforced as curtailed by the openings of freedom for enterprise 
and political expression. The associative forces of ethnicity and religion, to name but two of the 
‘missing’ associations of civil society mentioned above, have come to the fore during the period 
of multiparty politics. Ethnic and other forms of associative action, thereby, have thereby 
played no small part in the way which ruling state regimes have learned how to accommodate 
themselves to the new wave of political democratisation in Africa and elsewhere. Last, but not 
least, the injunction for ‘decentralised democracy’, as evidenced by the succouring of civil 
society organisations to provide social services, in place of the incapacities of central 
government to do the same, has only aggravated the tension that inheres in the ethnic and 
religious conflict and which, in part, has been opened up by the internal and external pressures 
for political and social reform.  
None of the forgoing is to suggest that the conditionality of the political, especially as enforced 
by economic conditionality, has been misguided by either intention or the unintended 
consequences of what was intended by way of setting out conditions for confronting 
authoritarian and corrupt state regimes within the ACP area. Rather, we point to the general 
difficulty involved in making civil society the key to the new political contract, as envisaged for 
Lomé V, by suggesting that the cart of political democracy cannot be simply be put before the 
horse of economic development. Given the admitted limitations of Lomé to enforce a course of 
economic development within the ACP area, the substitution of political for the economic 
conditions of development is not likely to carry much historical weight unless it is appreciated 
that, sooner or later, the state will be forced to play a developmental role throughout the ACP 
area to confront the scourge of mass poverty. ‘Civil society’, along with much that goes by the 
name of the new political contract, may then be appear as an adjunct to what makes a new era 
of state development possible.  
5. Conclusions  
1. Community between the EC/EU and the ACP group, and especially its African member 
states, has rested on the surprisingly durable fiction that the Lomé contractual Convention was 
made between sovereign equals. Since its codification in Lomé I, this fiction of communitarian 
equality grew out of a necessity to recognise the formal independence of what were colonial 
territories when European imperial rule ended. Recognition was necessarily rooted in the 
process of negotiating treaties that governed trade and aid relations between formal equals. 
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However, formal equality has always been belied by the substantial raison d’etre of Lome – that 
of development in the ACP area. The need for ACP development, as expressed by both 
partners to the Convention, was matched by an understanding that the ACP member states 
were only able to make development possible with the assistance of the EC/EU member 
states through a common agreement. To this extent, Lomé has also rested on a presumed 
inequality between two groups of states. Paradoxical though it may be, it has been the 
existence of the space between formal equality, as set out in the principles of Lomé, and the 
inequality inherent in its developmental premise that has figured large in the creation and 
longevity of the Lomé relationship.  
2. In the first part of this paper, we have explored aspects of the space between the prinicple of 
equality and the developmental premise of inequality. In particular, we attempted to show how 
the EC/EU effectively paid, through Lomé instruments, an insurance premium to ACP member 
states to protect them from risk which inheres in the export trade of primary products and raw 
materials. Latterly, the insurance principle has become one of social insurance with the aim of 
acting against the startling increase in mass poverty within the ACP area generally.  
3. We have shown the radically diminished significance of the trade element in the Lomé 
relationship. Trade, after the Treaty of Rome and Yaoundé Convention arrangements, has both 
been at the heart of the Lomé Convention and has made it distinct from the myriad of other 
international aid-centred relationships. Once Lomé became a mainly aid-oriented agreement, it 
lost its distinctiveness. Furthermore, the emphasis upon aid also undercut the rationale for 
Lomé as a treaty between equals, each of whose member states had the formal right to 
choose their own paths of development. The aid-orientated basis of Lomé IV, which started in 
1990, merely confirmed the final demise of socialist experiments in development within the 
ACP area. 
4. We have also drawn attention to the content and use of one of the foremost analyses of 
Lomé, that of ‘collective clientalism’. In so doing, we have shown why the Lomé ‘patron-client’ 
relation is ambiguous, especially by noting that it has become less possible for ACP member 
states to confer upon the EU the symbolic reward of ‘being good’ in return for donating material 
aid in the name of development. With the looming difficulties of areas closer to the European 
home, and with the growing importance of Asian and Latin American economic interests for EU 
member states, the ACP sanction of threatening to withdraw their symbolic reward now no 
longer carries whatever force it once did. Since a growing proportion of aid to the ACP area is 
advanced for purposes of humanitarian relief and poverty alleviation, the ACP group appears to 
become more of a supplicant than a client.  
After four decades of political independence for most states within the ACP area, the formal 
need to recognise the member states as equals has diminished. This end of a period of history, 
together with the weakened capacity of the ACP group to threaten withdrawal from the 
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Convention, makes it possible for the DG 8 to declare that the ‘post-colonial’ days are over. 
Instead of a distinctive economic relation with the ACP group that was established upon the 
post-colonial premise of political equality, the EU Commission, as expressed through DG’s 
Guidelines for renegotiating Lomé, now envisages a new political relation, named ‘contract’, 
which is premised upon the economic role which the group occupies as a supplicant. The 
purpose of the new political contract, on the EU side, is to make ACP member states aware of 
their responsibilities for development by effectively threatening the abolition of Lomé as a 
distinctive set of instruments for delivering aid. Conditionality has been the means by which the 
EC/EU has exercised its threat in the past and is likely to do moreso in the future by putting 
the ‘differentiation’ of ACP member states centre stage in the DG 8 Guidelines for negotiating 
Lomé V.  
5. The history of the attempts to enforce the economic conditionality of development aid by the 
World Bank and the IMF, from the early 1980s on, indicates that economic conditionality 
cannot be enforced without the correlate of political conditionality. By bringing political 
conditionality to the fore as part of the new political contract, the intention of the Commission 
is to suppose that political reform, through inducing democratic practices, will bring about 
change in the system of government which, especially in Africa, has made ACP member states 
economic supplicants of the EU. By acting for good government and thereby against 
corruption, in the name of good governance, the aspiration is to make political conditionality 
serve as a means for making economic development possible without dependence upon the 
older ‘post-colonial’ Lomé instruments for delivering aid. Instead of a generalised economic 
approach towards the ACP group as a whole, the new design for Lomé seems to envisage that 
member states will be selected according to criteria, with the political foremost among others, 
in rationing the given amount of aid which the EU as a whole deems can be afforded for a new 
Convention. 
6. The key question here is whether and/or how aid can be made an effective sanction against 
corruption or reward for good government and/or good governance. It remains to be seen 
whether, in an increasingly aid-centred relationship between donors and supplicants, sufficient 
sanctions are available for enabling the EU Commission to enforce its vision of economic and 
political conditionality no matter how desirable the ends of may be in themselves.  
While democratic multiparty elections may be deemed as a good end of government, in and of 
themselves, we have pointed out that there is no necessary connection between the 
implantation of formal liberal democratic practices and the elimination of corruption. Nor, given 
the ambiguities of what actually constitutes the civil societies of many ACP member states, 
especially the African ones, can it be presupposed that there is any necessary connection 
between the fostering of civil society and the lessening of corrupt practices. Nor is it clear that 
the regional dimension of a new Lomé, as proposed by DG 8, is on the cards. Recent events in 
Africa, particularly those arising out of recurrent warfare in the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa 
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regions, illustrate that possibilities for effective regional associations appear to be very remote 
during the immediate future.  
A new Lomé, as envisaged by DG 8, seems to follow the contours of general foreign policy as 
exercised by the United States and virtually all EU member states towards conflict within the 
ACP area. Whether severally or collectively, African states, for example, are enjoined to take 
responsibility for both internal political reform and external conflict prevention, including armed 
force where necessary. Yet, economic aid is used as a sanction to determine which courses of 
reform and conflict prevention are allowable. To exercise responsibility, on the part of any one 
or more ACP member states, also means the right to determine particular courses of action, 
including making war in the role of ‘peacekeeping’, which may be objectionable to the 
Commission and other EU agencies. We have showed in this paper that tension, between the 
sovereignty of responsibility and the accountability towards the EC/EU for what responsibility 
practically entails, has always been inherent in Lomé. A new Lomé does not ultimately 
diminish the tension as long as, for whatever reason, the EU also recognises its own 
responsibility for development within the ACP area. 
7. Much comment on the experience of Lomé IV, following similar evaluations of earlier 
conventions, suggested that the ‘end of Lomé’ was in sight. Equally, the bulk of proposals for 
what happens after Lomé IV seems to have lost sight of the prediction that the millenium will 
appear without Lomé. ACP member states, together with both northern and southern NGOs, 
have affirmed the principles of Lomé and pressed for their continuation in a new convention. The 
EU, contrary to what was expected during the 1990s, has not turned its back on the ACP. 
Since it has always been the case that only about 10 per cent of total EU aid, including that of 
its member states, is channelled through the Convention’s instruments, the end of Lomé would 
not mean the end of aid. However, the end of Lomé would make it more difficult for the Union to 
enforce the political accountability of aid, including the overwheming proportion of that which 
does not enter contractually into the Convention. This is ultimately what the new political 
contract, as proposed for Lomé V, is all about.  
An EU withdrawal from Lomé would make it more difficult to employ sanctions, irrespective of 
whether reasons of humanitarian outcry within the EU member states might follow from a 
withdrawal of aid. Or, withdrawal would make it more difficult to enforce action in the name of 
the express reasons why DG 8 is searching for the new political contract – refugee flight, the 
spread of cross border epidemic disease, and the growth of narcotics trade. If the EU, and its 
member states, were able to intervene directly, in particular ACP member states and areas, for 
these reasons, as well as those in the cause of internal political reform and ‘resolving’ external 
conflict, then the principles of Lomé would be redundant. It is by way of a reluctance to 
assume a new form of colonial responsibility that the ending of ‘post colonial’ days cannot be 
accompanied by the end of Lomé.  
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